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Message-Id: <20201012154530.28382-2-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2020 08:45:24 -0700
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
To: x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
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Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH v14 1/7] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking
Introduce Kconfig option X86_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER.
Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides protection against CALL-/JMP-
oriented programming attacks. It is active when the kernel has this
feature enabled, and the processor and the application support it.
When this feature is enabled, legacy non-IBT applications continue to
work, but without IBT protection.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 4b28a0ce4594..15c7f2606c9d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1966,6 +1966,25 @@ config X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER
If unsure, say N.
+config X86_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER
+ prompt "Intel Indirect Branch Tracking for user-mode"
+ def_bool n
+ depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
+ depends on $(cc-option,-fcf-protection)
+ select X86_CET
+ help
+ Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides protection against
+ CALL-/JMP-oriented programming attacks. It is active when
+ the kernel has this feature enabled, and the processor and
+ the application support it. When this feature is enabled,
+ legacy non-IBT applications continue to work, but without
+ IBT protection.
+ Support for this feature is only known to be present on
+ processors released in 2020 or later. CET features are also
+ known to increase kernel text size by 3.7 KB.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
+
config EFI
bool "EFI runtime service support"
depends on ACPI
--
2.21.0
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