linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH RFC PKS/PMEM 57/58] nvdimm/pmem: Stray access protection for pmem->virt

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20201012055218.GA2046448@iweiny-DESK2.sc.intel.com>
Date:   Sun, 11 Oct 2020 22:52:19 -0700
From:   Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@...el.com>
To:     John Hubbard <jhubbard@...dia.com>
Cc:     Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, x86@...nel.org,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@...ts.01.org,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org, bpf@...r.kernel.org,
        kexec@...ts.infradead.org, linux-bcache@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-mtd@...ts.infradead.org, devel@...verdev.osuosl.org,
        linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, linux-mmc@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-scsi@...r.kernel.org, target-devel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org, ceph-devel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org, linux-aio@...ck.org,
        io-uring@...r.kernel.org, linux-erofs@...ts.ozlabs.org,
        linux-um@...ts.infradead.org, linux-ntfs-dev@...ts.sourceforge.net,
        reiserfs-devel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-f2fs-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net,
        linux-nilfs@...r.kernel.org, cluster-devel@...hat.com,
        ecryptfs@...r.kernel.org, linux-cifs@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-btrfs@...r.kernel.org, linux-afs@...ts.infradead.org,
        linux-rdma@...r.kernel.org, amd-gfx@...ts.freedesktop.org,
        dri-devel@...ts.freedesktop.org, intel-gfx@...ts.freedesktop.org,
        drbd-dev@...ts.linbit.com, linux-block@...r.kernel.org,
        xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org, linux-cachefs@...hat.com,
        samba-technical@...ts.samba.org, intel-wired-lan@...ts.osuosl.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC PKS/PMEM 57/58] nvdimm/pmem: Stray access protection
 for pmem->virt_addr

On Fri, Oct 09, 2020 at 07:53:07PM -0700, John Hubbard wrote:
> On 10/9/20 12:50 PM, ira.weiny@...el.com wrote:
> > From: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@...el.com>
> > 
> > The pmem driver uses a cached virtual address to access its memory
> > directly.  Because the nvdimm driver is well aware of the special
> > protections it has mapped memory with, we call dev_access_[en|dis]able()
> > around the direct pmem->virt_addr (pmem_addr) usage instead of the
> > unnecessary overhead of trying to get a page to kmap.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@...el.com>
> > ---
> >   drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c | 4 ++++
> >   1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c b/drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c
> > index fab29b514372..e4dc1ae990fc 100644
> > --- a/drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c
> > +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/pmem.c
> > @@ -148,7 +148,9 @@ static blk_status_t pmem_do_read(struct pmem_device *pmem,
> >   	if (unlikely(is_bad_pmem(&pmem->bb, sector, len)))
> >   		return BLK_STS_IOERR;
> > +	dev_access_enable(false);
> >   	rc = read_pmem(page, page_off, pmem_addr, len);
> > +	dev_access_disable(false);
> 
> Hi Ira!
> 
> The APIs should be tweaked to use a symbol (GLOBAL, PER_THREAD), instead of
> true/false. Try reading the above and you'll see that it sounds like it's
> doing the opposite of what it is ("enable_this(false)" sounds like a clumsy
> API design to *disable*, right?). And there is no hint about the scope.

Sounds reasonable.

> 
> And it *could* be so much more readable like this:
> 
>     dev_access_enable(DEV_ACCESS_THIS_THREAD);

I'll think about the flag name.  I'm not liking 'this thread'.

Maybe DEV_ACCESS_[GLOBAL|THREAD]

Ira