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Message-ID: <20201013022157.GA47751@linux.intel.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2020 05:21:57 +0300
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
Cc: zohar@...ux.ibm.com, jejb@...ux.ibm.com, dhowells@...hat.com,
jens.wiklander@...aro.org, corbet@....net, jmorris@...ei.org,
serge@...lyn.com, casey@...aufler-ca.com, janne.karhunen@...il.com,
daniel.thompson@...aro.org, Markus.Wamser@...ed-mode.de,
lhinds@...hat.com, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
op-tee@...ts.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 4/4] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys
On Wed, Oct 07, 2020 at 03:37:48PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
> Add MAINTAINERS entry for TEE based Trusted Keys framework.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
> ---
> MAINTAINERS | 8 ++++++++
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
> index 48aff80..eb3d889 100644
> --- a/MAINTAINERS
> +++ b/MAINTAINERS
> @@ -9663,6 +9663,14 @@ F: include/keys/trusted-type.h
> F: include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> F: security/keys/trusted-keys/
>
> +KEYS-TRUSTED-TEE
> +M: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
> +L: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
> +L: keyrings@...r.kernel.org
> +S: Supported
> +F: include/keys/trusted_tee.h
> +F: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
> +
> KEYS/KEYRINGS
> M: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
> M: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
> --
> 2.7.4
I'm sorry but I think I have changed my mind on this. This has been
spinning for a while and sometimes conclusions change over the time.
I don't think that we really need a separate subsystem tag. I'd be for a
new M-entry or R-entry to the existing subsystem tag. It's essential to
have ack from someone with ARM and TEE knowledge but this way too heavy
for the purpose.
I also see it the most manageable if the trusted keys PR's come from a
single source.
/Jarkko
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