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Message-ID: <20201015122122.GA4963@linux-8mug>
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2020 20:21:22 +0800
From: Chester Lin <clin@...e.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>,
Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@...nel.org>,
Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
linux-integrity <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-efi <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
"Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@...e.com>, clin@...e.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] efi: add secure boot get helper
Hi Ard and Mimi,
On Wed, Oct 14, 2020 at 07:56:17AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Wed, 2020-10-14 at 13:00 +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > Hello Chester,
> >
> > Thanks for looking into this.
> >
> > Some comments below.
> >
> > On Wed, 14 Oct 2020 at 12:41, Chester Lin <clin@...e.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Separate the get_sb_mode() from arch/x86 and treat it as a common function
> > > [rename to efi_get_secureboot_mode] so all EFI-based architectures can
> > > reuse the same logic.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Chester Lin <clin@...e.com>
> > > ---
> > > arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c | 47 ++------------------------------------
> > > drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > include/linux/efi.h | 5 ++++
> > > 3 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c
> > > index 7dfb1e808928..ed4623ecda6e 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c
> > > @@ -8,49 +8,6 @@
> > >
> > > extern struct boot_params boot_params;
> > >
> > > -static enum efi_secureboot_mode get_sb_mode(void)
> > > -{
> > > - efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
> > > - efi_status_t status;
> > > - unsigned long size;
> > > - u8 secboot, setupmode;
> > > -
> > > - size = sizeof(secboot);
> > > -
> > > - if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE)) {
> > > - pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown, no efi\n");
> > > - return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
> > > - }
> > > -
> > > - /* Get variable contents into buffer */
> > > - status = efi.get_variable(L"SecureBoot", &efi_variable_guid,
> > > - NULL, &size, &secboot);
> > > - if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
> > > - pr_info("ima: secureboot mode disabled\n");
> > > - return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
> > > - }
> > > -
> > > - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
> > > - pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown\n");
> > > - return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
> > > - }
> > > -
> > > - size = sizeof(setupmode);
> > > - status = efi.get_variable(L"SetupMode", &efi_variable_guid,
> > > - NULL, &size, &setupmode);
> > > -
> > > - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) /* ignore unknown SetupMode */
> > > - setupmode = 0;
> > > -
> > > - if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1) {
> > > - pr_info("ima: secureboot mode disabled\n");
> > > - return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
> > > - }
> > > -
> > > - pr_info("ima: secureboot mode enabled\n");
> > > - return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
> > > -}
> > > -
> > > bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
> > > {
> > > static enum efi_secureboot_mode sb_mode;
> > > @@ -60,7 +17,7 @@ bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
> > > sb_mode = boot_params.secure_boot;
> > >
> > > if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unset)
> > > - sb_mode = get_sb_mode();
> > > + sb_mode = efi_get_secureboot_mode();
> > > initialized = true;
> > > }
> > >
> > > @@ -70,7 +27,7 @@ bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
> > > return false;
> > > }
> > >
> > > -/* secureboot arch rules */
> > > +/* secure and trusted boot arch rules */
> > > static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = {
> > > #if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG)
> > > "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig",
> > > diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> > > index 5e5480a0a32d..68ffa6a069c0 100644
> > > --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> > > +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
> > > @@ -1022,3 +1022,46 @@ static int __init register_update_efi_random_seed(void)
> > > }
> > > late_initcall(register_update_efi_random_seed);
> > > #endif
> > > +
> > > +enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot_mode(void)
> > > +{
> > > + efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
> > > + efi_status_t status;
> > > + unsigned long size;
> > > + u8 secboot, setupmode;
> > > +
> > > + size = sizeof(secboot);
> > > +
> > > + if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE)) {
> > > + pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown, no efi\n");
> >
> > These prints don't belong here anymore.
> >
> > Also, it would be useful if we could reuse this logic in the EFI stub
> > as well, which is built as a separate executable, and does not provide
> > efi.get_variable().
> >
> > So, you could you please break this up into
> >
> > static inline
> > enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi_get_variable_t *get_var)
> > {
> > }
> >
> > placed into include/linux/efi.h, which encapsulates the core logic,
> > but using get_var(), and without the prints.
> >
> > Then, we could put something like
> >
> > bool efi_ima_get_secureboot(void)
> > {
> > }
> >
> > in drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c (guarded by #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_xxx),
> > which performs the
> > efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE)) check, calls
> > efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi.get_variable), and implements the logic.
> >
> > And actually, if the logic is identical between x86 and arm64, I
> > wonder if it wouldn't be better to put the whole thing into
> >
> > drivers/firmware/efi/efi-ima.c
> >
> > or
> >
> > security/integrity/ima/ima-efi.c
> >
> > with the only difference being the boot_params->secure_boot access for
> > x86, which we can factor out to a static inline helper.
> >
> > Mimi, any thoughts here?
>
> Sounds good. Keeping as much IMA code in the IMA directory makes
> sense. The IMA Makefile would then include ima-efi.c based on an EFI
> Kconfig option.
>
> thanks,
>
> Mimi
Thanks for your suggestions. I will include them in v3.
Regards,
Chester
> >
> >
> >
> > > + return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + /* Get variable contents into buffer */
> > > + status = efi.get_variable(L"SecureBoot", &efi_variable_guid,
> > > + NULL, &size, &secboot);
> > > + if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
> > > + pr_info("ima: secureboot mode disabled\n");
> > > + return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
> > > + pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown\n");
> > > + return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + size = sizeof(setupmode);
> > > + status = efi.get_variable(L"SetupMode", &efi_variable_guid,
> > > + NULL, &size, &setupmode);
> > > +
> > > + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) /* ignore unknown SetupMode */
> > > + setupmode = 0;
> > > +
> > > + if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1) {
> > > + pr_info("ima: secureboot mode disabled\n");
> > > + return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + pr_info("ima: secureboot mode enabled\n");
> > > + return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
> > > +}
> > > diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
> > > index d7c0e73af2b9..a73e5ae04672 100644
> > > --- a/include/linux/efi.h
> > > +++ b/include/linux/efi.h
> > > @@ -1076,8 +1076,13 @@ static inline int efi_runtime_map_copy(void *buf, size_t bufsz)
> > >
> > > #ifdef CONFIG_EFI
> > > extern bool efi_runtime_disabled(void);
> > > +extern enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot_mode(void);
> > > #else
> > > static inline bool efi_runtime_disabled(void) { return true; }
> > > +static inline enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot_mode(void)
> > > +{
> > > + return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
> > > +}
> > > #endif
> > >
> > > extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call);
> > > --
> > > 2.26.1
> > >
>
>
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