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Message-ID: <20201015143207.GB25286@mail.hallyn.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2020 09:32:07 -0500
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
To: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@...hat.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
Alexander Mihalicyn <alexander@...alicyn.com>,
Mrunal Patel <mpatel@...hat.com>, Wat Lim <watl@...gle.com>,
Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,
Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@...tuozzo.com>,
Geoffrey Thomas <geofft@...reload.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Joseph Christopher Sible <jcsible@...t.org>,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Stephane Graber <stgraber@...ntu.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: LPC 2020 Hackroom Session: summary and next steps for isolated
user namespaces
On Tue, Oct 13, 2020 at 05:17:36PM +0200, Giuseppe Scrivano wrote:
> "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com> writes:
>
> > On Mon, Oct 12, 2020 at 07:05:10PM +0200, Giuseppe Scrivano wrote:
> >> Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org> writes:
> >>
> >> > On Fri, Oct 09, 2020 at 11:26:06PM -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >> >> > 3. Find a way to allow setgroups() in a user namespace while keeping
> >> >> > in mind the case of groups used for negative access control.
> >> >> > This was suggested by Josh Triplett and Geoffrey Thomas. Their idea was to
> >> >> > investigate adding a prctl() to allow setgroups() to be called in a user
> >> >> > namespace at the cost of restricting paths to the most restrictive
> >> >> > permission. So if something is 0707 it needs to be treated as if it's 0000
> >> >> > even though the caller is not in its owning group which is used for negative
> >> >> > access control (how these new semantics will interact with ACLs will also
> >> >> > need to be looked into).
> >> >>
> >> >> I should probably think this through more, but for this problem, would it
> >> >> not suffice to add a new prevgroups grouplist to the struct cred, maybe
> >> >> struct group_info *locked_groups, and every time an unprivileged task creates
> >> >> a new user namespace, add all its current groups to this list?
> >> >
> >> > So, effectively, you would be allowed to drop permissions, but
> >> > locked_groups would still be checked for restrictions?
> >> >
> >> > That seems like it'd introduce a new level of complexity (a new facet of
> >> > permission) to manage. Not opposed, but it does seem more complex than
> >> > just opting out of using groups for negative permissions.
> >>
> >> I have played with something similar in the past. At that time I've
> >> discussed it only privately with Eric and we agreed it wasn't worth the
> >> extra complexity:
> >>
> >> https://github.com/giuseppe/linux/commit/7e0701b389c497472d11fab8570c153a414050af
> >
> > Hi, you linked the setgroups patch, but do you also have a link to the
> > attempt which you deemed was not worth it?
>
> it was just part of a private discussion; but was 4 years ago so we can
> probably revisit and accept the additional complexity since setgroups()
> is still an issue with user namespaces.
>
>
> >> instead of a prctl, I've added a new mode to /proc/PID/setgroups that
> >> allows setgroups in a userns locking the current gids.
> >>
> >> What do you think about using /proc/PID/setgroups instead of a new
> >> prctl()?
> >
> > It's better than not having it, but two concerns -
> >
> > 1. some userspace, especially testsuites, could become confused by the fact
> > that they can't drop groups no matter how hard they try, since these will all
> > still show up as regular groups.
>
> I forgot to send a link to a second patch :-) that completes the feature:
> https://github.com/giuseppe/linux/commit/1c5fe726346b216293a527719e64f34e6297f0c2
>
> When the new mode is used, the gids that are not known in the userns do
> not show up in userspace.
Ah, right - and of course those gids better not be mapped into the namespace :)
But so, this is the patch you said you agreed was not worth the extra
complexity?
> > 2. whereas in my lockgroups proposal, lock_groups would only be taken into account
> > for permission denial, this proposal would count for permission grants too. This
> > means that if I have a group which is permitted to read /foo/topsecret, and I
> > start a program in a new user namespace expecting it to drop that permission,
> > I can't have that, right? The new program, will always have that permission?
>
> right. The new mode I was working on cannot be used to drop granted permissions.
>
> Giuseppe
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