linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] drivers/virt: vmgenid: add vm generation id driver

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Message-ID: <20201018115524-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>
Date:   Sun, 18 Oct 2020 11:59:39 -0400
From:   "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc:     "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>,
        Colm MacCarthaigh <colmmacc@...zon.com>,
        "Catangiu, Adrian Costin" <acatan@...zon.com>,
        "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
        "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list:VIRTIO GPU DRIVER" 
        <virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
        "Graf (AWS), Alexander" <graf@...zon.de>,
        "Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>, bonzini@....org,
        "Singh, Balbir" <sblbir@...zon.com>,
        "Weiss, Radu" <raduweis@...zon.com>, oridgar@...il.com,
        ghammer@...hat.com, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Qemu Developers <qemu-devel@...gnu.org>,
        KVM list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>,
        "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>,
        Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] drivers/virt: vmgenid: add vm generation id driver

On Sun, Oct 18, 2020 at 08:54:36AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 18, 2020 at 8:52 AM Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@...hat.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Sat, Oct 17, 2020 at 03:24:08PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> > > 4c. The guest kernel maintains an array of physical addresses that are
> > > MADV_WIPEONFORK. The hypervisor knows about this array and its
> > > location through whatever protocol, and before resuming a
> > > moved/snapshotted/duplicated VM, it takes the responsibility for
> > > memzeroing this memory. The huge pro here would be that this
> > > eliminates all races, and reduces complexity quite a bit, because the
> > > hypervisor can perfectly synchronize its bringup (and SMP bringup)
> > > with this, and it can even optimize things like on-disk memory
> > > snapshots to simply not write out those pages to disk.
> > >
> > > A 4c-like approach seems like it'd be a lot of bang for the buck -- we
> > > reuse the existing mechanism (MADV_WIPEONFORK), so there's no new
> > > userspace API to deal with, and it'd be race free, and eliminate a lot
> > > of kernel complexity.
> >
> > Clearly this has a chance to break applications, right?
> > If there's an app that uses this as a non-system-calls way
> > to find out whether there was a fork, it will break
> > when wipe triggers without a fork ...
> > For example, imagine:
> >
> > MADV_WIPEONFORK
> > copy secret data to MADV_DONTFORK
> > fork
> >
> >
> > used to work, with this change it gets 0s instead of the secret data.
> >
> >
> > I am also not sure it's wise to expose each guest process
> > to the hypervisor like this. E.g. each process needs a
> > guest physical address of its own then. This is a finite resource.
> >
> >
> > The mmap interface proposed here is somewhat baroque, but it is
> > certainly simple to implement ...
> 
> Wipe of fork/vmgenid/whatever could end up being much more problematic
> than it naively appears -- it could be wiped in the middle of a read.
> Either the API needs to handle this cleanly, or we need something more
> aggressive like signal-on-fork.
> 
> --Andy


Right, it's not on fork, it's actually when process is snapshotted.

If we assume it's CRIU we care about, then I
wonder what's wrong with something like
MADV_CHANGEONPTRACE_SEIZE
and basically say it's X bytes which change the value...


-- 
MST