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Message-ID: <20201020085957.GF9328@suse.de>
Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2020 10:59:57 +0200
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>
To: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@...m.mit.edu>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, x86@...nel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Martin Radev <martin.b.radev@...il.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] x86/boot/compressed/64: Check SEV encryption in
64-bit boot-path
On Mon, Oct 19, 2020 at 05:31:06PM -0400, Arvind Sankar wrote:
> Is it possible to take advantage of this to make the check independent
> of the original page tables? i.e. switch to the new pagetables, then
> write into .data or .bss the opcodes for a function that does
> movabs $imm64, %rax
> jmp *%rdi // avoid using stack for the return
> filling in the imm64 with the RDRAND value, and then try to execute it.
> If the C-bit value is wrong, this will probably crash, and at any rate
> shouldn't return with the correct value in %rax.
That could work, but is not reliable. When the C bit is wrong the CPU
would essentially execute random data, which could also be a valid
instruction stream. A crash is not guaranteed.
Regards,
Joerg
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