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Message-ID: <20201020154408.GA22179@suse.de>
Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2020 17:44:08 +0200
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>
To: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@...m.mit.edu>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, x86@...nel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Martin Radev <martin.b.radev@...il.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] x86/boot/compressed/64: Check SEV encryption in
64-bit boot-path
On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 10:33:12AM -0400, Arvind Sankar wrote:
> That doesn't feel like a big loss: if a malicious hypervisor wanted to
> induce completely random code execution, it can do that anyway by just
> messing with the guest-to-host translation, no?
Yes, but relying on defined behavior is still better. Undefined behavior
could also mean it jumps to some other code which then leaks data.
Regards,
Joerg
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