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Message-Id: <20201020191732.4049987-5-salyzyn@android.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2020 12:17:32 -0700
From: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@...roid.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-team@...roid.com, Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@...roid.com>,
John Stultz <john.stultz@...aro.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v17 4/4] overlayfs: inode_owner_or_capable called during execv
Using old_creds as an indication that we are not overriding the
credentials, bypass call to inode_owner_or_capable. This solves
a problem with all execv calls being blocked when using the caller's
credentials.
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@...aro.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@...roid.com>
Fixes: 05acefb4872da ("ovl: check permission to open real file")
To: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
To: linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-team@...roid.com
v17 - rebase
v16 - introduced fix over rebased series
---
fs/overlayfs/file.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/file.c b/fs/overlayfs/file.c
index b1357bb067d9..9ab9663b02d8 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/file.c
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static struct file *ovl_open_realfile(const struct file *file,
err = inode_permission(realinode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode);
if (err) {
realfile = ERR_PTR(err);
- } else if (!inode_owner_or_capable(realinode)) {
+ } else if (old_cred && !inode_owner_or_capable(realinode)) {
realfile = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
} else {
realfile = open_with_fake_path(&file->f_path, flags, realinode,
--
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
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