linux-kernel - [PATCH v3 2/5] x86/boot/compressed/64: Add CPUID sanity check to early #VC handler

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Message-Id: <20201021123938.3696-3-joro@8bytes.org>
Date:   Wed, 21 Oct 2020 14:39:35 +0200
From:   Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>
To:     x86@...nel.org
Cc:     Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Arvind Sankar <nivedita@...m.mit.edu>,
        Martin Radev <martin.b.radev@...il.com>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 2/5] x86/boot/compressed/64: Add CPUID sanity check to early #VC handler

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>

The early #VC handler which doesn't have a GHCB can only handle CPUID
exit codes. It is needed by the early boot code to handle #VC
exceptions raised in verify_cpu() and to get the position of the C
bit.

But the CPUID information comes from the hypervisor, which is untrusted
and might return results which trick the guest into the no-SEV boot path
with no C bit set in the page-tables. All data written to memory would
then be unencrypted and could leak sensitive data to the hypervisor.

Add sanity checks to the early #VC handlers to make sure the hypervisor
can not pretend that SEV is disabled.

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
index 5f83ccaab877..48bb14563dcd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
@@ -178,6 +178,32 @@ void __init do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
 		goto fail;
 	regs->dx = val >> 32;
 
+	/*
+	 * This is a VC handler and it is only raised when SEV-ES is active,
+	 * which means SEV must be active too. Do sanity checks on the CPUID
+	 * results to make sure the hypervisor does not trick the kernel into
+	 * the no-sev path. This could map sensitive data unencrypted and make
+	 * it accessible to the hypervisor.
+	 *
+	 * In particular, check for:
+	 *	- Hypervisor CPUID bit
+	 *	- Availability of CPUID leaf 0x8000001f
+	 *	- SEV CPUID bit.
+	 *
+	 * The hypervisor might still report the wrong C-bit position, but this
+	 * can't be checked here.
+	 */
+
+	if ((fn == 1 && !(regs->cx & BIT(31))))
+		/* Hypervisor Bit */
+		goto fail;
+	else if (fn == 0x80000000 && (regs->ax < 0x8000001f))
+		/* SEV Leaf check */
+		goto fail;
+	else if ((fn == 0x8000001f && !(regs->ax & BIT(1))))
+		/* SEV Bit */
+		goto fail;
+
 	/* Skip over the CPUID two-byte opcode */
 	regs->ip += 2;
 
-- 
2.28.0