linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v4 1/6] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs

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Message-ID: <45aae09df5c301497efc697c17921e9b2a3c8ae8.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date:   Thu, 22 Oct 2020 15:39:25 -0400
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@...ux.microsoft.com>,
        stephen.smalley.work@...il.com, casey@...aufler-ca.com,
        agk@...hat.com, snitzer@...hat.com, gmazyland@...il.com
Cc:     tyhicks@...ux.microsoft.com, sashal@...nel.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
        nramas@...ux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        selinux@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, dm-devel@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/6] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement
 constructs

Hi Tushar,

On Wed, 2020-09-23 at 12:20 -0700, Tushar Sugandhi wrote:

> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index fe1df373c113..31a772d8a86b 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -451,15 +451,19 @@ int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event,
>  }
>  
>  /**
> - * ima_match_keyring - determine whether the keyring matches the measure rule
> - * @rule: a pointer to a rule
> - * @keyring: name of the keyring to match against the measure rule
> + * ima_match_rule_data - determine whether the given func_data matches
> + *			 the measure rule data
> + * @rule: IMA policy rule
> + * @opt_list: rule data to match func_data against
> + * @func_data: data to match against the measure rule data
>   * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
>   *
> - * Returns true if keyring matches one in the rule, false otherwise.
> + * Returns true if func_data matches one in the rule, false otherwise.
>   */
> -static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
> -			      const char *keyring, const struct cred *cred)
> +static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
> +				const struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list,
> +				const char *func_data,
> +				const struct cred *cred)
>  {
>  	bool matched = false;
>  	size_t i;
> @@ -467,14 +471,14 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
>  	if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
>  		return false;
>  
> -	if (!rule->keyrings)
> +	if (!opt_list)
>  		return true;

The opt_list should be based on rule->func.  There shouldn't be a need
to pass it as a variable.

Mimi

>  
> -	if (!keyring)
> +	if (!func_data)
>  		return false;
>  
> -	for (i = 0; i < rule->keyrings->count; i++) {
> -		if (!strcmp(rule->keyrings->items[i], keyring)) {
> +	for (i = 0; i < opt_list->count; i++) {
> +		if (!strcmp(opt_list->items[i], func_data)) {
>  			matched = true;
>  			break;
>  		}