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Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2020 19:09:37 -0400
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
To: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@...nel.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH] tracing, synthetic events: Replace buggy strcat() with
seq_buf operations
From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@...dmis.org>
There was a memory corruption bug happening while running the synthetic
event selftests:
kmemleak: Cannot insert 0xffff8c196fa2afe5 into the object search tree (overlaps existing)
CPU: 5 PID: 6866 Comm: ftracetest Tainted: G W 5.9.0-rc5-test+ #577
Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP Compaq Pro 6300 SFF/339A, BIOS K01 v03.03 07/14/2016
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x8d/0xc0
create_object.cold+0x3b/0x60
slab_post_alloc_hook+0x57/0x510
? tracing_map_init+0x178/0x340
__kmalloc+0x1b1/0x390
tracing_map_init+0x178/0x340
event_hist_trigger_func+0x523/0xa40
trigger_process_regex+0xc5/0x110
event_trigger_write+0x71/0xd0
vfs_write+0xca/0x210
ksys_write+0x70/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7fef0a63a487
Code: 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb bb 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24
RSP: 002b:00007fff76f18398 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000039 RCX: 00007fef0a63a487
RDX: 0000000000000039 RSI: 000055eb3b26d690 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 000055eb3b26d690 R08: 000000000000000a R09: 0000000000000038
R10: 000055eb3b2cdb80 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000039
R13: 00007fef0a70b500 R14: 0000000000000039 R15: 00007fef0a70b700
kmemleak: Kernel memory leak detector disabled
kmemleak: Object 0xffff8c196fa2afe0 (size 8):
kmemleak: comm "ftracetest", pid 6866, jiffies 4295082531
kmemleak: min_count = 1
kmemleak: count = 0
kmemleak: flags = 0x1
kmemleak: checksum = 0
kmemleak: backtrace:
__kmalloc+0x1b1/0x390
tracing_map_init+0x1be/0x340
event_hist_trigger_func+0x523/0xa40
trigger_process_regex+0xc5/0x110
event_trigger_write+0x71/0xd0
vfs_write+0xca/0x210
ksys_write+0x70/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
The cause came down to a use of strcat() that was adding a string that was
shorten, but the strcat() did not take that into account.
strcat() is extremely dangerous as it does not care how big the buffer is.
Replace it with seq_buf operations that prevent the buffer from being
overwritten if what is being written is bigger than the buffer.
Fixes: 10819e25799a ("tracing: Handle synthetic event array field type checking correctly")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@...dmis.org>
---
kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c
index 3212e2c653b3..bdd427ccdfc5 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c
@@ -585,6 +585,7 @@ static struct synth_field *parse_synth_field(int argc, const char **argv,
struct synth_field *field;
const char *prefix = NULL, *field_type = argv[0], *field_name, *array;
int len, ret = 0;
+ struct seq_buf s;
ssize_t size;
if (field_type[0] == ';')
@@ -630,13 +631,9 @@ static struct synth_field *parse_synth_field(int argc, const char **argv,
field_type++;
len = strlen(field_type) + 1;
- if (array) {
- int l = strlen(array);
+ if (array)
+ len += strlen(array);
- if (l && array[l - 1] == ';')
- l--;
- len += l;
- }
if (prefix)
len += strlen(prefix);
@@ -645,14 +642,18 @@ static struct synth_field *parse_synth_field(int argc, const char **argv,
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto free;
}
+ seq_buf_init(&s, field->type, len);
if (prefix)
- strcat(field->type, prefix);
- strcat(field->type, field_type);
+ seq_buf_puts(&s, prefix);
+ seq_buf_puts(&s, field_type);
if (array) {
- strcat(field->type, array);
- if (field->type[len - 1] == ';')
- field->type[len - 1] = '\0';
+ seq_buf_puts(&s, array);
+ if (s.buffer[s.len - 1] == ';')
+ s.len--;
}
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!seq_buf_buffer_left(&s)))
+ goto free;
+ s.buffer[s.len] = '\0';
size = synth_field_size(field->type);
if (size < 0) {
@@ -663,17 +664,23 @@ static struct synth_field *parse_synth_field(int argc, const char **argv,
if (synth_field_is_string(field->type)) {
char *type;
- type = kzalloc(sizeof("__data_loc ") + strlen(field->type) + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ len = sizeof("__data_loc ") + strlen(field->type) + 1;
+ type = kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!type) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto free;
}
- strcat(type, "__data_loc ");
- strcat(type, field->type);
+ seq_buf_init(&s, type, len);
+ seq_buf_puts(&s, "__data_loc ");
+ seq_buf_puts(&s, field->type);
kfree(field->type);
- field->type = type;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!seq_buf_buffer_left(&s)))
+ goto free;
+ s.buffer[s.len] = '\0';
+
+ field->type = type;
field->is_dynamic = true;
size = sizeof(u64);
} else {
--
2.25.4
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