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Message-ID: <20201023155604.GA3908702@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2020 08:56:04 -0700
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
To: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@...m.mit.edu>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
"linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/6] crypto: Use memzero_explicit() for clearing state
On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 11:39:27AM -0400, Arvind Sankar wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 09:36:33PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 04:39:52PM -0400, Arvind Sankar wrote:
> > > Without the barrier_data() inside memzero_explicit(), the compiler may
> > > optimize away the state-clearing if it can tell that the state is not
> > > used afterwards. At least in lib/crypto/sha256.c:__sha256_final(), the
> > > function can get inlined into sha256(), in which case the memset is
> > > optimized away.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@...m.mit.edu>
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>
> >
> > Maybe get the one in arch/arm64/crypto/sha3-ce-glue.c too?
> >
> > - Eric
>
> Hm, there are a few more as well like that. But now I'm thinking it's
> only the generic sha256.c that may be problematic. The rest of them are
> in _final() functions which will be stored as function pointers in a
> structure, so there should be no risk of them getting optimized away?
When clearing memory because "it may be sensitive" rather than "it's needed for
the code to behave correctly", I think it's best to use memzero_explicit() to
make the intent clear, even if it seems that memset() is sufficient. Also keep
in mind that support for compiling the kernel with LTO (link-time optimization)
is being worked on (and some people already do it), which results in more code
being optimized out.
- Eric
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