linux-kernel - Re: [RFCv2 15/16] KVM: Unmap protected pages from direct mapping

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Message-ID: <20201023163158.GB5580@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Fri, 23 Oct 2020 09:32:00 -0700
From:   Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
To:     Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
Cc:     "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
        "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
        "Kleen, Andi" <andi.kleen@...el.com>,
        Liran Alon <liran.alon@...cle.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFCv2 15/16] KVM: Unmap protected pages from direct mapping

On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 03:37:12PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 09:18:58AM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > If the protected memory feature enabled, unmap guest memory from
> > kernel's direct mappings.
> > 
> > Migration and KSM is disabled for protected memory as it would require a
> > special treatment.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
> > ---
> >  include/linux/mm.h       |  3 +++
> >  mm/huge_memory.c         |  8 ++++++++
> >  mm/ksm.c                 |  2 ++
> >  mm/memory.c              | 12 ++++++++++++
> >  mm/rmap.c                |  4 ++++
> >  virt/lib/mem_protected.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
> >  6 files changed, 50 insertions(+)
> > 
> > diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
> > index ee274d27e764..74efc51e63f0 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/mm.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
> > @@ -671,6 +671,9 @@ static inline bool vma_is_kvm_protected(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> >  	return vma->vm_flags & VM_KVM_PROTECTED;
> >  }
> >  
> > +void kvm_map_page(struct page *page, int nr_pages);
> > +void kvm_unmap_page(struct page *page, int nr_pages);
> 
> This still does not seem right ;-)
> 
> And I still think that map/unmap primitives shoud be a part of the
> generic mm rather than exported by KVM.

Ya, and going a step further, I suspect it will be cleaner in the long run if
the kernel does not automatically map or unmap when converting between private
and shared/public memory.  Conversions will be rare in a well behaved guest, so
exiting to userspace and forcing userspace to do the unmap->map would not be a
performance bottleneck.  In theory, userspace could also maintain separate
pools for private vs. public mappings, though I doubt any VMM will do that in
practice.