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Message-ID: <CAG48ez2u-B_DQ5yyiexycTz6okQZvU0rB3+MG1nAFtoahfPa6Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 26 Oct 2020 23:40:12 +0100
From:   Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
To:     Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
Cc:     "open list:HARDWARE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR CORE" 
        <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        syzkaller-bugs <syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com>,
        linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Elena Petrova <lenaptr@...gle.com>,
        Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...cle.com>,
        "Gustavo A . R . Silva" <gustavoars@...nel.org>,
        stable <stable@...r.kernel.org>,
        syzbot <syzbot+92ead4eb8e26a26d465e@...kaller.appspotmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] crypto: af_alg - avoid undefined behavior accessing salg_name

On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 10:57 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org> wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 10:23:35PM +0100, 'Jann Horn' via syzkaller-bugs wrote:
> > On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 9:08 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org> wrote:
> > > Commit 3f69cc60768b ("crypto: af_alg - Allow arbitrarily long algorithm
> > > names") made the kernel start accepting arbitrarily long algorithm names
> > > in sockaddr_alg.
> >
> > That's not true; it's still limited by the size of struct
> > sockaddr_storage (128 bytes total for the entire address).
>
> Interesting, so the actual limit is 104 bytes.  It seems like the intent of that
> commit was to make it unlimited, though...
>
> > If you make it longer, __copy_msghdr_from_user() will silently truncate the
> > size.
>
> That's used for sys_sendmsg(), which AFAICT isn't relevant here.  sockaddr_alg
> is used with sys_bind(), which fails with EINVAL if the address is longer than
> sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage).

Ugh, of course you're right, sorry.

> However, since sys_sendmsg() is truncating overly-long addresses, it's probably
> the case that sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage) can never be increased in the
> future...

Eh, I think there'd probably be bigger issues with that elsewhere.

> > > This is broken because the kernel can access indices >= 64 in salg_name,
> > > which is undefined behavior -- even though the memory that is accessed
> > > is still located within the sockaddr structure.  It would only be
> > > defined behavior if the array were properly marked as arbitrary-length
> > > (either by making it a flexible array, which is the recommended way
> > > these days, or by making it an array of length 0 or 1).
> > >
> > > We can't simply change salg_name into a flexible array, since that would
> > > break source compatibility with userspace programs that embed
> > > sockaddr_alg into another struct, or (more commonly) declare a
> > > sockaddr_alg like 'struct sockaddr_alg sa = { .salg_name = "foo" };'.
> > >
> > > One solution would be to change salg_name into a flexible array only
> > > when '#ifdef __KERNEL__'.  However, that would keep userspace without an
> > > easy way to actually use the longer algorithm names.
> > >
> > > Instead, add a new structure 'sockaddr_alg_new' that has the flexible
> > > array field, and expose it to both userspace and the kernel.
> > > Make the kernel use it correctly in alg_bind().
> > [...]
> > > @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static int alg_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
> > >         const u32 allowed = CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY;
> > >         struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> > >         struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
> > > -       struct sockaddr_alg *sa = (void *)uaddr;
> > > +       struct sockaddr_alg_new *sa = (void *)uaddr;
> > >         const struct af_alg_type *type;
> > >         void *private;
> > >         int err;
> > > @@ -155,7 +155,11 @@ static int alg_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
> > >         if (sock->state == SS_CONNECTED)
> > >                 return -EINVAL;
> > >
> > > -       if (addr_len < sizeof(*sa))
> > > +       BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct sockaddr_alg_new, salg_name) !=
> > > +                    offsetof(struct sockaddr_alg, salg_name));
> > > +       BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct sockaddr_alg, salg_name) != sizeof(*sa));
> > > +
> > > +       if (addr_len < sizeof(*sa) + 1)
> > >                 return -EINVAL;
> > >
> > >         /* If caller uses non-allowed flag, return error. */
> > > @@ -163,7 +167,7 @@ static int alg_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
> > >                 return -EINVAL;
> > >
> > >         sa->salg_type[sizeof(sa->salg_type) - 1] = 0;
> > > -       sa->salg_name[sizeof(sa->salg_name) + addr_len - sizeof(*sa) - 1] = 0;
> > > +       sa->salg_name[addr_len - sizeof(*sa) - 1] = 0;
> >
> > This looks like an out-of-bounds write in the case `addr_len ==
> > sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)`.

Sorry, I've been unusually unconcentrated today. Sorry about the
noise, ignore what I said.

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