lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:   Tue, 27 Oct 2020 14:45:37 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@....com>,
        Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@....com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Subject: [PATCH 5.9 087/757] crypto: caam/qi2 - add support for more XTS key lengths

From: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@....com>

commit 596efd57cfa1e1bee575e2a2df44fd8ec5e4a42d upstream.

CAAM accelerator only supports XTS-AES-128 and XTS-AES-256 since
it adheres strictly to the standard. All the other key lengths
are accepted and processed through a fallback as long as they pass
the xts_verify_key() checks.

Fixes: 226853ac3ebe ("crypto: caam/qi2 - add skcipher algorithms")
Cc: <stable@...r.kernel.org> # v4.20+
Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@....com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@....com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c |   16 ++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/fsl/mc.h>
 #include <soc/fsl/dpaa2-io.h>
 #include <soc/fsl/dpaa2-fd.h>
+#include <crypto/xts.h>
 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
 
 #define CAAM_CRA_PRIORITY	2000
@@ -81,6 +82,7 @@ struct caam_ctx {
 	struct alginfo adata;
 	struct alginfo cdata;
 	unsigned int authsize;
+	bool xts_key_fallback;
 	struct crypto_skcipher *fallback;
 };
 
@@ -1060,11 +1062,15 @@ static int xts_skcipher_setkey(struct cr
 	u32 *desc;
 	int err;
 
-	if (keylen != 2 * AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE  && keylen != 2 * AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
+	err = xts_verify_key(skcipher, key, keylen);
+	if (err) {
 		dev_dbg(dev, "key size mismatch\n");
-		return -EINVAL;
+		return err;
 	}
 
+	if (keylen != 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128 && keylen != 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_256)
+		ctx->xts_key_fallback = true;
+
 	err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(ctx->fallback, key, keylen);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
@@ -1474,7 +1480,8 @@ static int skcipher_encrypt(struct skcip
 	if (!req->cryptlen && !ctx->fallback)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (ctx->fallback && xts_skcipher_ivsize(req)) {
+	if (ctx->fallback && (xts_skcipher_ivsize(req) ||
+			      ctx->xts_key_fallback)) {
 		skcipher_request_set_tfm(&caam_req->fallback_req, ctx->fallback);
 		skcipher_request_set_callback(&caam_req->fallback_req,
 					      req->base.flags,
@@ -1522,7 +1529,8 @@ static int skcipher_decrypt(struct skcip
 	if (!req->cryptlen && !ctx->fallback)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (ctx->fallback && xts_skcipher_ivsize(req)) {
+	if (ctx->fallback && (xts_skcipher_ivsize(req) ||
+			      ctx->xts_key_fallback)) {
 		skcipher_request_set_tfm(&caam_req->fallback_req, ctx->fallback);
 		skcipher_request_set_callback(&caam_req->fallback_req,
 					      req->base.flags,


Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ