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Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2020 10:51:46 -0000
From: "tip-bot2 for Mathieu Desnoyers" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
x86 <x86@...nel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [tip: sched/core] sched: membarrier: document memory ordering scenarios
The following commit has been merged into the sched/core branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 25595eb6aaa9fbb31330f1e0b400642694bc6574
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/25595eb6aaa9fbb31330f1e0b400642694bc6574
Author: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com>
AuthorDate: Tue, 20 Oct 2020 09:47:15 -04:00
Committer: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
CommitterDate: Thu, 29 Oct 2020 11:00:31 +01:00
sched: membarrier: document memory ordering scenarios
Document membarrier ordering scenarios in membarrier.c. Thanks to Alan
Stern for refreshing my memory. Now that I have those in mind, it seems
appropriate to serialize them to comments for posterity.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@...radead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201020134715.13909-4-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
---
kernel/sched/membarrier.c | 128 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 128 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/sched/membarrier.c b/kernel/sched/membarrier.c
index f223f35..5a40b38 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/membarrier.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/membarrier.c
@@ -7,6 +7,134 @@
#include "sched.h"
/*
+ * For documentation purposes, here are some membarrier ordering
+ * scenarios to keep in mind:
+ *
+ * A) Userspace thread execution after IPI vs membarrier's memory
+ * barrier before sending the IPI
+ *
+ * Userspace variables:
+ *
+ * int x = 0, y = 0;
+ *
+ * The memory barrier at the start of membarrier() on CPU0 is necessary in
+ * order to enforce the guarantee that any writes occurring on CPU0 before
+ * the membarrier() is executed will be visible to any code executing on
+ * CPU1 after the IPI-induced memory barrier:
+ *
+ * CPU0 CPU1
+ *
+ * x = 1
+ * membarrier():
+ * a: smp_mb()
+ * b: send IPI IPI-induced mb
+ * c: smp_mb()
+ * r2 = y
+ * y = 1
+ * barrier()
+ * r1 = x
+ *
+ * BUG_ON(r1 == 0 && r2 == 0)
+ *
+ * The write to y and load from x by CPU1 are unordered by the hardware,
+ * so it's possible to have "r1 = x" reordered before "y = 1" at any
+ * point after (b). If the memory barrier at (a) is omitted, then "x = 1"
+ * can be reordered after (a) (although not after (c)), so we get r1 == 0
+ * and r2 == 0. This violates the guarantee that membarrier() is
+ * supposed by provide.
+ *
+ * The timing of the memory barrier at (a) has to ensure that it executes
+ * before the IPI-induced memory barrier on CPU1.
+ *
+ * B) Userspace thread execution before IPI vs membarrier's memory
+ * barrier after completing the IPI
+ *
+ * Userspace variables:
+ *
+ * int x = 0, y = 0;
+ *
+ * The memory barrier at the end of membarrier() on CPU0 is necessary in
+ * order to enforce the guarantee that any writes occurring on CPU1 before
+ * the membarrier() is executed will be visible to any code executing on
+ * CPU0 after the membarrier():
+ *
+ * CPU0 CPU1
+ *
+ * x = 1
+ * barrier()
+ * y = 1
+ * r2 = y
+ * membarrier():
+ * a: smp_mb()
+ * b: send IPI IPI-induced mb
+ * c: smp_mb()
+ * r1 = x
+ * BUG_ON(r1 == 0 && r2 == 1)
+ *
+ * The writes to x and y are unordered by the hardware, so it's possible to
+ * have "r2 = 1" even though the write to x doesn't execute until (b). If
+ * the memory barrier at (c) is omitted then "r1 = x" can be reordered
+ * before (b) (although not before (a)), so we get "r1 = 0". This violates
+ * the guarantee that membarrier() is supposed to provide.
+ *
+ * The timing of the memory barrier at (c) has to ensure that it executes
+ * after the IPI-induced memory barrier on CPU1.
+ *
+ * C) Scheduling userspace thread -> kthread -> userspace thread vs membarrier
+ *
+ * CPU0 CPU1
+ *
+ * membarrier():
+ * a: smp_mb()
+ * d: switch to kthread (includes mb)
+ * b: read rq->curr->mm == NULL
+ * e: switch to user (includes mb)
+ * c: smp_mb()
+ *
+ * Using the scenario from (A), we can show that (a) needs to be paired
+ * with (e). Using the scenario from (B), we can show that (c) needs to
+ * be paired with (d).
+ *
+ * D) exit_mm vs membarrier
+ *
+ * Two thread groups are created, A and B. Thread group B is created by
+ * issuing clone from group A with flag CLONE_VM set, but not CLONE_THREAD.
+ * Let's assume we have a single thread within each thread group (Thread A
+ * and Thread B). Thread A runs on CPU0, Thread B runs on CPU1.
+ *
+ * CPU0 CPU1
+ *
+ * membarrier():
+ * a: smp_mb()
+ * exit_mm():
+ * d: smp_mb()
+ * e: current->mm = NULL
+ * b: read rq->curr->mm == NULL
+ * c: smp_mb()
+ *
+ * Using scenario (B), we can show that (c) needs to be paired with (d).
+ *
+ * E) kthread_{use,unuse}_mm vs membarrier
+ *
+ * CPU0 CPU1
+ *
+ * membarrier():
+ * a: smp_mb()
+ * kthread_unuse_mm()
+ * d: smp_mb()
+ * e: current->mm = NULL
+ * b: read rq->curr->mm == NULL
+ * kthread_use_mm()
+ * f: current->mm = mm
+ * g: smp_mb()
+ * c: smp_mb()
+ *
+ * Using the scenario from (A), we can show that (a) needs to be paired
+ * with (g). Using the scenario from (B), we can show that (c) needs to
+ * be paired with (d).
+ */
+
+/*
* Bitmask made from a "or" of all commands within enum membarrier_cmd,
* except MEMBARRIER_CMD_QUERY.
*/
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