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Message-ID: <20201030060840.1810-3-clin@suse.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2020 14:08:39 +0800
From: Chester Lin <clin@...e.com>
To: ardb@...nel.org, zohar@...ux.ibm.com, jmorris@...ei.org,
serge@...lyn.com, dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com,
catalin.marinas@....com, will@...nel.org, tglx@...utronix.de,
mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de, hpa@...or.com
CC: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
jlee@...e.com, clin@...e.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 2/3] ima: replace arch-specific get_sb_mode() with a common helper ima_get_efi_secureboot()
remove the get_sb_mode() from x86/kernel/ima_arch.c and create a common
helper ima_get_efi_secureboot() in IMA so that all EFI-based architectures
can refer to the same procedure.
Signed-off-by: Chester Lin <clin@...e.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c | 69 +++++++-------------------------
include/linux/ima.h | 10 +++++
security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c | 26 ++++++++++++
4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c
index 7dfb1e808928..2c773532ff0a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c
@@ -8,69 +8,28 @@
extern struct boot_params boot_params;
-static enum efi_secureboot_mode get_sb_mode(void)
-{
- efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
- efi_status_t status;
- unsigned long size;
- u8 secboot, setupmode;
-
- size = sizeof(secboot);
-
- if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE)) {
- pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown, no efi\n");
- return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
- }
-
- /* Get variable contents into buffer */
- status = efi.get_variable(L"SecureBoot", &efi_variable_guid,
- NULL, &size, &secboot);
- if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
- pr_info("ima: secureboot mode disabled\n");
- return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
- }
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
- pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown\n");
- return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
- }
-
- size = sizeof(setupmode);
- status = efi.get_variable(L"SetupMode", &efi_variable_guid,
- NULL, &size, &setupmode);
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) /* ignore unknown SetupMode */
- setupmode = 0;
-
- if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1) {
- pr_info("ima: secureboot mode disabled\n");
- return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
- }
-
- pr_info("ima: secureboot mode enabled\n");
- return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
-}
-
bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
{
- static enum efi_secureboot_mode sb_mode;
- static bool initialized;
-
- if (!initialized && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
- sb_mode = boot_params.secure_boot;
+ static bool sb_enabled, initialized;
- if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unset)
- sb_mode = get_sb_mode();
+ if (initialized) {
+ return sb_enabled;
+ } else if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
initialized = true;
+
+ if (boot_params.secure_boot == efi_secureboot_mode_unset) {
+ sb_enabled = ima_get_efi_secureboot();
+ return sb_enabled;
+ }
}
- if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled)
- return true;
- else
- return false;
+ if (boot_params.secure_boot == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled)
+ sb_enabled = true;
+
+ return sb_enabled;
}
-/* secureboot arch rules */
+/* secure and trusted boot arch rules */
static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = {
#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG)
"appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig",
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 8fa7bcfb2da2..9f9699f017be 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -50,6 +50,16 @@ static inline const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
}
#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_EFI) && defined(CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT)
+extern bool ima_get_efi_secureboot(void);
+#else
+static inline bool ima_get_efi_secureboot(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+#endif
+
+
#else
static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index 67dabca670e2..32076b3fd292 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -14,3 +14,4 @@ ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += ima_asymmetric_keys.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS) += ima_queue_keys.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_EFI) += ima_efi.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a78f66e19689
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 SUSE LLC
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Chester Lin <clin@...e.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
+bool ima_get_efi_secureboot(void)
+{
+ enum efi_secureboot_mode sb_mode;
+
+ if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE)) {
+ pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown, no efi\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ sb_mode = efi_get_secureboot(efi.get_variable);
+
+ return (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled) ? true : false;
+}
+#endif
--
2.28.0
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