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Message-ID: <CAAeHK+zTPyX6h+8uJvjKwryA1U3L0ErufSoAmNvBu=QC5bomXw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2020 16:17:04 +0100
From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
To: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>,
Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@...gle.com>,
Kostya Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>,
Peter Collingbourne <pcc@...gle.com>,
Serban Constantinescu <serbanc@...gle.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Elena Petrova <lenaptr@...gle.com>,
Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@....com>,
Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@....com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
kasan-dev <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>,
Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 16/21] kasan: optimize poisoning in kmalloc and krealloc
On Wed, Oct 28, 2020 at 5:55 PM Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Oct 22, 2020 at 3:20 PM Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com> wrote:
> >
> > Since kasan_kmalloc() always follows kasan_slab_alloc(), there's no need
> > to reunpoison the object data, only to poison the redzone.
> >
> > This requires changing kasan annotation for early SLUB cache to
> > kasan_slab_alloc(). Otherwise kasan_kmalloc() doesn't untag the object.
> > This doesn't do any functional changes, as kmem_cache_node->object_size
> > is equal to sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node).
> >
> > Similarly for kasan_krealloc(), as it's called after ksize(), which
> > already unpoisoned the object, there's no need to do it again.
>
> Have you considered doing this the other way around: make krealloc
> call __ksize and unpoison in kasan_krealloc?
> This has the advantage of more precise poisoning as ksize will
> unpoison the whole underlying object.
>
> But then maybe we will need to move first checks in ksize into __ksize
> as we may need them in krealloc as well.
This might be a good idea. I won't implement this for the next
version, but will look into this after that. Thanks!
>
>
>
>
>
> > Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
> > Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I4083d3b55605f70fef79bca9b90843c4390296f2
> > ---
> > mm/kasan/common.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
> > mm/slub.c | 3 +--
> > 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> > index c5ec60e1a4d2..a581937c2a44 100644
> > --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> > +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> > @@ -360,8 +360,14 @@ static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
> > if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS))
> > tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false, keep_tag);
> >
> > - /* Tag is ignored in set_tag without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS */
> > - kasan_unpoison_memory(set_tag(object, tag), size);
> > + /*
> > + * Don't unpoison the object when keeping the tag. Tag is kept for:
> > + * 1. krealloc(), and then the memory has already been unpoisoned via ksize();
> > + * 2. kmalloc(), and then the memory has already been unpoisoned by kasan_kmalloc().
> > + * Tag is ignored in set_tag() without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS.
> > + */
> > + if (!keep_tag)
> > + kasan_unpoison_memory(set_tag(object, tag), size);
> > kasan_poison_memory((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
> > KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
> >
> > @@ -384,10 +390,9 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object
> > }
> > EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_kmalloc);
> >
> > -void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
> > - gfp_t flags)
> > +static void * __must_check ____kasan_kmalloc_large(struct page *page, const void *ptr,
> > + size_t size, gfp_t flags, bool realloc)
> > {
> > - struct page *page;
> > unsigned long redzone_start;
> > unsigned long redzone_end;
> >
> > @@ -397,18 +402,24 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
> > if (unlikely(ptr == NULL))
> > return NULL;
> >
> > - page = virt_to_page(ptr);
> > - redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size),
> > - KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> > + redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size), KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> > redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(page);
> >
> > - kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, size);
> > + /* ksize() in __do_krealloc() already unpoisoned the memory. */
> > + if (!realloc)
> > + kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, size);
> > kasan_poison_memory((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
> > KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE);
> >
> > return (void *)ptr;
> > }
> >
> > +void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
> > + gfp_t flags)
> > +{
> > + return ____kasan_kmalloc_large(virt_to_page(ptr), ptr, size, flags, false);
> > +}
> > +
> > void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
> > {
> > struct page *page;
> > @@ -419,7 +430,7 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag
> > page = virt_to_head_page(object);
> >
> > if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page)))
> > - return __kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags);
> > + return ____kasan_kmalloc_large(page, object, size, flags, true);
> > else
> > return ____kasan_kmalloc(page->slab_cache, object, size,
> > flags, true);
> > diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
> > index 1d3f2355df3b..afb035b0bf2d 100644
> > --- a/mm/slub.c
> > +++ b/mm/slub.c
> > @@ -3535,8 +3535,7 @@ static void early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(int node)
> > init_object(kmem_cache_node, n, SLUB_RED_ACTIVE);
> > init_tracking(kmem_cache_node, n);
> > #endif
> > - n = kasan_kmalloc(kmem_cache_node, n, sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node),
> > - GFP_KERNEL);
> > + n = kasan_slab_alloc(kmem_cache_node, n, GFP_KERNEL);
> > page->freelist = get_freepointer(kmem_cache_node, n);
> > page->inuse = 1;
> > page->frozen = 0;
> > --
> > 2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
> >
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