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Message-Id: <20201103162057.22916-3-rppt@kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 18:20:55 +0200
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@...s.berkeley.edu>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
"Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Heiko Carstens <hca@...ux.ibm.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
Len Brown <len.brown@...el.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>,
Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...ysocki.net>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Vasily Gorbik <gor@...ux.ibm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-pm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org, linux-s390@...r.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, sparclinux@...r.kernel.org,
x86@...nel.org, "Rafael J . Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 2/4] PM: hibernate: make direct map manipulations more explicit
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>
When DEBUG_PAGEALLOC or ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP is enabled a page may be
not present in the direct map and has to be explicitly mapped before it
could be copied.
Introduce hibernate_map_page() that will explicitly use
set_direct_map_{default,invalid}_noflush() for ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP case
and debug_pagealloc_map_pages() for DEBUG_PAGEALLOC case.
The remapping of the pages in safe_copy_page() presumes that it only
changes protection bits in an existing PTE and so it is safe to ignore
return value of set_direct_map_{default,invalid}_noflush().
Still, add a pr_warn() so that future changes in set_memory APIs will not
silently break hibernation.
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
---
include/linux/mm.h | 12 ------------
kernel/power/snapshot.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 1fc0609056dc..14e397f3752c 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2927,16 +2927,6 @@ static inline bool debug_pagealloc_enabled_static(void)
#if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC) || defined(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP)
extern void __kernel_map_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, int enable);
-/*
- * When called in DEBUG_PAGEALLOC context, the call should most likely be
- * guarded by debug_pagealloc_enabled() or debug_pagealloc_enabled_static()
- */
-static inline void
-kernel_map_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, int enable)
-{
- __kernel_map_pages(page, numpages, enable);
-}
-
static inline void debug_pagealloc_map_pages(struct page *page,
int numpages, int enable)
{
@@ -2948,8 +2938,6 @@ static inline void debug_pagealloc_map_pages(struct page *page,
extern bool kernel_page_present(struct page *page);
#endif /* CONFIG_HIBERNATION */
#else /* CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC || CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP */
-static inline void
-kernel_map_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, int enable) {}
static inline void debug_pagealloc_map_pages(struct page *page,
int numpages, int enable) {}
#ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION
diff --git a/kernel/power/snapshot.c b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
index 46b1804c1ddf..57d54b9d84bb 100644
--- a/kernel/power/snapshot.c
+++ b/kernel/power/snapshot.c
@@ -76,6 +76,34 @@ static inline void hibernate_restore_protect_page(void *page_address) {}
static inline void hibernate_restore_unprotect_page(void *page_address) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX && CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY */
+static inline void hibernate_map_page(struct page *page, int enable)
+{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP)) {
+ unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * This should not fail because remapping a page here means
+ * that we only update protection bits in an existing PTE.
+ * It is still worth to have a warning here if something
+ * changes and this will no longer be the case.
+ */
+ if (enable)
+ ret = set_direct_map_default_noflush(page);
+ else
+ ret = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_warn_once("Failed to remap page\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE);
+ } else {
+ debug_pagealloc_map_pages(page, 1, enable);
+ }
+}
+
static int swsusp_page_is_free(struct page *);
static void swsusp_set_page_forbidden(struct page *);
static void swsusp_unset_page_forbidden(struct page *);
@@ -1355,9 +1383,9 @@ static void safe_copy_page(void *dst, struct page *s_page)
if (kernel_page_present(s_page)) {
do_copy_page(dst, page_address(s_page));
} else {
- kernel_map_pages(s_page, 1, 1);
+ hibernate_map_page(s_page, 1);
do_copy_page(dst, page_address(s_page));
- kernel_map_pages(s_page, 1, 0);
+ hibernate_map_page(s_page, 0);
}
}
--
2.28.0
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