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Message-Id: <20201103203235.556322057@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 21:35:14 +0100
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 022/191] evm: Check size of security.evm before using it
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
commit 455b6c9112eff8d249e32ba165742085678a80a4 upstream.
This patch checks the size for the EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG and
EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG types to ensure that the algorithm is read from
the buffer returned by vfs_getxattr_alloc().
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org # 4.19.x
Fixes: 5feeb61183dde ("evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -186,6 +186,12 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_
break;
case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG:
+ /* accept xattr with non-empty signature field */
+ if (xattr_len <= sizeof(struct signature_v2_hdr)) {
+ evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)xattr_data;
digest.hdr.algo = hdr->hash_algo;
rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
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