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Message-ID: <34576238-eedf-4a94-880a-c961d2d5b237@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 13:35:08 +0800
From: Tao Xu <tao3.xu@...el.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
kvm list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: VMX: Enable Notify VM exit
On 11/3/20 1:31 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 02, 2020 at 08:43:30AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Sun, Nov 1, 2020 at 10:14 PM Tao Xu <tao3.xu@...el.com> wrote:
>>> 2. Another patch to disable interception of #DB and #AC when notify
>>> VM-Exiting is enabled.
>>
>> Whoa there.
>>
>> A VM control that says "hey, CPU, if you messed up and livelocked for
>> a long time, please break out of the loop" is not a substitute for
>> fixing the livelocks. So I don't think you get do disable
>> interception of #DB and #AC.
>
> I think that can be incorporated into a module param, i.e. let the platform
> owner decide which tool(s) they want to use to mitigate the legacy architecture
> flaws.
>
>> I also think you should print a loud warning
>
> I'm not so sure on this one, e.g. userspace could just spin up a new instance
> if its malicious guest and spam the kernel log.
>
>> and have some intelligent handling when this new exit triggers.
>
> We discussed something similar in the context of the new bus lock VM-Exit. I
> don't know that it makes sense to try and add intelligence into the kernel.
> In many use cases, e.g. clouds, the userspace VMM is trusted (inasmuch as
> userspace can be trusted), while the guest is completely untrusted. Reporting
> the error to userspace and letting the userspace stack take action is likely
> preferable to doing something fancy in the kernel.
>
>
> Tao, this patch should probably be tagged RFC, at least until we can experiment
> with the threshold on real silicon. KVM and kernel behavior may depend on the
> accuracy of detecting actual attacks, e.g. if we can set a threshold that has
> zero false negatives and near-zero false postives, then it probably makes sense
> to be more assertive in how such VM-Exits are reported and logged.
>
Sorry, I should add RFC tag for this patch. I will add it next time.
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