linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v36 00/13] /dev/random

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Message-ID: <20201104142654.isznf3lkgupuxubv@valinor.lan>
Date:   Wed, 4 Nov 2020 11:26:54 -0300
From:   Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@...onical.com>
To:     Torsten Duwe <duwe@....de>
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
        Stephan Müller <smueller@...onox.de>,
        Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
        Nicolai Stange <nstange@...e.de>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@...il.com>,
        "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@...il.com>,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
        Vito Caputo <vcaputo@...garu.com>,
        Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@...ger.ca>,
        Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Ray Strode <rstrode@...hat.com>,
        William Jon McCann <mccann@....edu>,
        zhangjs <zachary@...shancloud.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@...inter.de>,
        Peter Matthias <matthias.peter@....bund.de>,
        Neil Horman <nhorman@...hat.com>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@...ia.fr>,
        Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>,
        And y Lavr <andy.lavr@...il.com>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
        "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
        Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@...e.cz>, simo@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v36 00/13] /dev/random - a new approach

On Mon, Nov 02, 2020 at 02:44:35PM +0100, Torsten Duwe wrote:
> On Wed, 28 Oct 2020 19:07:28 +0100
> Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> wrote:
> 
> > On Wed, Oct 28, 2020 at 06:51:17PM +0100, Torsten Duwe wrote:
> > > On Mon, 19 Oct 2020 21:28:50 +0200
> > > Stephan Müller <smueller@...onox.de> wrote:
> > > [...]
> > > > * Sole use of crypto for data processing:
> > > [...]
> > > >  - The LRNG uses only properly defined and implemented
> > > > cryptographic algorithms unlike the use of the SHA-1
> > > > transformation in the existing /dev/random implementation.
> > > > 
> > > >  - Hash operations use NUMA-node-local hash instances to benefit
> > > > large parallel systems.
> > > > 
> > > >  - LRNG uses limited number of data post-processing steps
> > > [...]
> > > > * Performance
> > > > 
> > > >  - Faster by up to 75% in the critical code path of the interrupt
> > > > handler depending on data collection size configurable at kernel
> > > > compile time - the default is about equal in performance with
> > > > existing /dev/random as outlined in [2] section 4.2.
> > > 
> > > [...]
> > > >  - ChaCha20 DRNG is significantly faster as implemented in the
> > > > existing /dev/random as demonstrated with [2] table 2.
> > > > 
> > > >  - Faster entropy collection during boot time to reach fully
> > > > seeded level, including on virtual systems or systems with SSDs as
> > > > outlined in [2] section 4.1.
> > > > 
> > > > * Testing
> > > [...]
> > > 
> > > So we now have 2 proposals for a state-of-the-art RNG, and over a
> > > month without a single comment on-topic from any `get_maintainer.pl`
> > > 
> > > I don't want to emphasise the certification aspects so much. The
> > > interrelation is rather that those certifications require certain
> > > code features, features which are reasonable per se. But the
> > > current code is lagging way behind.
> > > 
> > > I see the focus namely on performance, scalability, testability and
> > > virtualisation. And it certainly is an advantage to use the code
> > > already present under crypto, with its optimisations, and not rely
> > > on some home brew.
> > > 
> > > Can we please have a discussion about how to proceed?
> > > Ted, Greg, Arnd: which approach would you prefer?
> > 
> > Greg and Arnd are not the random driver maintainers, as is now
> > correctly shown in the 5.10-rc1 MAINTAINERS file, so I doubt we (well
> > at least I) have any say here, sorry.
> 
> No problem. get_maintainer (for the proposals) works on paths, not on
> topics and I didn't want to leave anybody out.
> 
> Ted, if you don't have the time any more to take care of /dev/random,
> it's not a shame to hand over maintainership, especially given your
> long history of Linux contributions.
> 
> Please do seriously consider to hand it over to someone new. This would
> be a good opportunity.
> 
> 	Torsten
>

I'd like to help with any solution upstream decide to follow either
testing or with code. I understand some of the concerns the community
has regarding FIPS but that doesn't make it less relevant and it's
totally possible to improve /dev/random while allowing it users to
decide if they want to comply to SP 800 90B. I believe the main
blocker now is the lack of direction.

-- 
Regards,
Marcelo


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