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Message-Id: <82219b5988592173ba4fbf07abcb7009e3d7265a.1604534322.git.andreyknvl@google.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2020 01:02:20 +0100
From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@...gle.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@....com>,
Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@....com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH 10/20] kasan: inline and rename kasan_unpoison_memory
Currently kasan_unpoison_memory() is used as both an external annotation
and as an internal memory poisoning helper. Rename external annotation to
kasan_unpoison_data() and inline the internal helper for hardware
tag-based mode to avoid undeeded function calls.
There's the external annotation kasan_unpoison_slab() that is currently
defined as static inline and uses kasan_unpoison_memory(). With this
change it's turned into a function call. Overall, this results in the
same number of calls for hardware tag-based mode as
kasan_unpoison_memory() is now inlined.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ia7c8b659f79209935cbaab3913bf7f082cc43a0e
---
include/linux/kasan.h | 16 ++++++----------
kernel/fork.c | 2 +-
mm/kasan/common.c | 10 ++++++++++
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 6 ------
mm/kasan/kasan.h | 7 +++++++
mm/slab_common.c | 2 +-
6 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
index 0211a4ec5d87..34236f134472 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -72,14 +72,15 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
-void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size);
-
void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
slab_flags_t *flags);
+void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size);
+void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr);
+
void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page);
void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
void kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object);
@@ -104,11 +105,6 @@ struct kasan_cache {
int free_meta_offset;
};
-size_t __ksize(const void *);
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr)
-{
- kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, __ksize(ptr));
-}
size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache);
bool kasan_save_enable_multi_shot(void);
@@ -116,8 +112,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
#else /* CONFIG_KASAN */
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size) {}
-
static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
@@ -125,6 +119,9 @@ static inline void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache,
unsigned int *size,
slab_flags_t *flags) {}
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size) { }
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr) { }
+
static inline void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page) {}
static inline void kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache,
void *object) {}
@@ -164,7 +161,6 @@ static inline bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
return false;
}
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr) { }
static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 463ef51f2b05..d6ff6b5650aa 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static unsigned long *alloc_thread_stack_node(struct task_struct *tsk, int node)
continue;
/* Mark stack accessible for KASAN. */
- kasan_unpoison_memory(s->addr, THREAD_SIZE);
+ kasan_unpoison_data(s->addr, THREAD_SIZE);
/* Clear stale pointers from reused stack. */
memset(s->addr, 0, THREAD_SIZE);
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index a266b90636a1..4598c1364f19 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -184,6 +184,16 @@ struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
return kasan_reset_tag(object) + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset;
}
+void kasan_unpoison_data(const void *address, size_t size)
+{
+ kasan_unpoison_memory(address, size);
+}
+
+void kasan_unpoison_slab(const void *ptr)
+{
+ kasan_unpoison_memory(ptr, __ksize(ptr));
+}
+
void kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page)
{
unsigned long i;
diff --git a/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c b/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c
index 9d7b1f1a2553..bd8bf05c8034 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c
@@ -26,12 +26,6 @@ void kasan_init_hw_tags(void)
pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
}
-void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
-{
- hw_set_mem_tag_range(kasan_reset_tag(address),
- round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address));
-}
-
void kasan_set_free_info(struct kmem_cache *cache,
void *object, u8 tag)
{
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
index 73364acf6ec8..ba850285a360 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
@@ -279,6 +279,12 @@ static inline void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 valu
round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), value);
}
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
+{
+ hw_set_mem_tag_range(kasan_reset_tag(address),
+ round_up(size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE), get_tag(address));
+}
+
static inline bool check_invalid_free(void *addr)
{
u8 ptr_tag = get_tag(addr);
@@ -291,6 +297,7 @@ static inline bool check_invalid_free(void *addr)
#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
void kasan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
+void kasan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size);
bool check_invalid_free(void *addr);
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index 53d0f8bb57ea..f1b0c4a22f08 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)
* We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area,
* so we need to unpoison this area.
*/
- kasan_unpoison_memory(objp, size);
+ kasan_unpoison_data(objp, size);
return size;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ksize);
--
2.29.1.341.ge80a0c044ae-goog
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