linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v40 10/24] mm: Add 'mprotect' hook to struct vm_operations

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Message-ID: <e70c9e92-0bd4-59a4-21b1-bccf8621c6bb@intel.com>
Date:   Fri, 6 Nov 2020 09:54:19 -0800
From:   Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To:     "Dr. Greg" <greg@...ellic.com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
        Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>,
        Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@...cle.com>,
        andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com, asapek@...gle.com, bp@...en8.de,
        cedric.xing@...el.com, chenalexchen@...gle.com,
        conradparker@...gle.com, cyhanish@...gle.com,
        haitao.huang@...el.com, kai.huang@...el.com, kai.svahn@...el.com,
        kmoy@...gle.com, ludloff@...gle.com, luto@...nel.org,
        nhorman@...hat.com, npmccallum@...hat.com, puiterwijk@...hat.com,
        rientjes@...gle.com, tglx@...utronix.de, yaozhangx@...gle.com,
        mikko.ylinen@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v40 10/24] mm: Add 'mprotect' hook to struct
 vm_operations_struct

On 11/6/20 9:43 AM, Dr. Greg wrote:
> In light of this, given the decision by the driver authors to not
> fully equip the driver with EDMM support, the mprotect protection
> requirements are straight forward and minimalistic.  All that is
> needed is a binary valued variable, set on the command-line, that
> either allows or denies anonymous code execution by an enclave,
> ie. access to page protection changes after initialization.

To that, I say NAK.  We need more flexibility than a boot-time-fixed,
system-wide switch.