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Message-ID: <ebaff261-f8ad-d184-edd5-8efbd675deeb@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2020 10:16:47 -0800
From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
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Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
On 11/6/2020 9:34 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 12, 2020 at 08:38:25AM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
>> +[1] Overview
>> +============
>> +
>> +Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) is an Intel processor feature
>> +that provides protection against return/jump-oriented programming (ROP)
>> +attacks. It can be set up to protect both applications and the kernel.
>> +Only user-mode protection is implemented in the 64-bit kernel, including
>> +support for running legacy 32-bit applications.
>> +
>> +CET introduces Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking. Shadow stack is
>> +a secondary stack allocated from memory and cannot be directly modified by
>> +applications. When executing a CALL, the processor pushes the return
> ^
> . .. instruction ...
>
I will update it.
[...]
>> +
>> +[2] Application Enabling
>> +========================
>> +
>> +An application's CET capability is marked in its ELF header and can be
>> +verified from the following command output, in the NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0
>> +field:
>> +
>> + readelf -n <application>
>
> Can be verified how? What does it say for a CET-enabled executable? Put
> it here in the doc pls.
>
readelf -n <application> | grep SHSTK
properties: x86 feature: IBT, SHSTK
I will add this.
[...]
>> +[3] Backward Compatibility
>> +==========================
>> +
>> +GLIBC provides a few tunables for backward compatibility.
>> +
>> +GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.tune.hwcaps=-SHSTK,-IBT
>> + Turn off SHSTK/IBT for the current shell.
>
> For the current shell? How?
>
> You mean, you execute the kernel shell with that variable set? So you
> set this variable in any executable's env which links with glibc in
> order to disable CET?
>
> In any case, this needs clarification.
>
In the current shell, if GLIBC_TUNABLES variable is set as such,
applications started will have CET features disabled. I can put more
details here, or maybe a reference to the GLIBC man pages.
Thanks,
Yu-cheng
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