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Message-ID: <651318720.14321.1604918519928@office.mailbox.org>
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2020 11:41:59 +0100 (CET)
From: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@...u.net>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Idan Yaniv <idan.yaniv@....com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
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Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>,
Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
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x86@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create
"secret" memory areas
> On 11/04/2020 6:02 PM Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org> wrote:
>
> Yes, this will work. The processes that share the memfd_secret file
> descriptor will have access to the same memory pages, pretty much like
> with shared memory.
Perfect!
Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@...u.net>
Thank you for the effort Mike, if zeroize feature will also included it will
be great! The memset-all-pages after use is just overkill, a dedicated flag for
memfd_secret (or mmap) would be superior.
Hagen
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