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Date:   Thu, 12 Nov 2020 00:30:57 +0000
From:   Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>
To:     Trond Myklebust <trondmy@...merspace.com>
Cc:     "linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org" <linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org>,
        "smayhew@...hat.com" <smayhew@...hat.com>,
        "dhowells@...hat.com" <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        "linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "chuck.lever@...cle.com" <chuck.lever@...cle.com>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "schumaker.anna@...il.com" <schumaker.anna@...il.com>,
        "alban.crequy@...il.com" <alban.crequy@...il.com>,
        "anna.schumaker@...app.com" <anna.schumaker@...app.com>,
        "mauricio@...volk.io" <mauricio@...volk.io>,
        "bfields@...ldses.org" <bfields@...ldses.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/2] NFS: Fix interaction between fs_context and user
 namespaces

On Wed, Nov 11, 2020 at 08:03:18PM +0000, Trond Myklebust wrote:
> On Wed, 2020-11-11 at 18:57 +0000, Sargun Dhillon wrote:
> > On Wed, Nov 11, 2020 at 02:38:11PM +0000, Trond Myklebust wrote:
> > > On Wed, 2020-11-11 at 11:12 +0000, Sargun Dhillon wrote:
> > > 
> > > The current code for setting server->cred was developed
> > > independently
> > > of fsopen() (and predates it actually). I'm fine with the change to
> > > have server->cred be the cred of the user that called fsopen().
> > > That's
> > > in line with what we used to do for sys_mount().
> > > 
> > Just curious, without FS_USERNS, how were you mounting NFSv4 in an
> > unprivileged user ns?
> 
> The code was originally developed on a 5.1 kernel. So all my testing
> has been with ordinary sys_mount() calls in a container that had
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
> 
> > > However all the other stuff to throw errors when the user namespace
> > > is
> > > not init_user_ns introduces massive regressions.
> > > 
> > 
> > I can remove that and respin the patch. How do you feel about that? 
> > I would 
> > still like to keep the log lines though because it is a uapi change.
> > I am 
> > worried that someone might exercise this path with GSS and allow for
> > upcalls 
> > into the main namespaces by accident -- or be confused of why they're
> > seeing 
> > upcalls "in a different namespace".
> > 
> > Are you okay with picking up ("NFS: NFSv2/NFSv3: Use cred from
> > fs_context during 
> > mount") without any changes?
> 
> Why do we need the dprintk()s? It seems to me that either they should
> be reporting something that the user needs to know (in which case they
> should be real printk()s) or they are telling us something that we
> should already know. To me they seem to fit more in the latter
> category.
> 
> > 
> > I can respin ("NFSv4: Refactor NFS to use user namespaces") without:
> > /*
> >  * nfs4idmap is not fully isolated by user namespaces. It is
> > currently
> >  * only network namespace aware. If upcalls never happen, we do not
> >  * need to worry as nfs_client instances aren't shared between
> >  * user namespaces.
> >  */
> > if (idmap_userns(server->nfs_client->cl_idmap) != &init_user_ns && 
> >         !(server->caps & NFS_CAP_UIDGID_NOMAP)) {
> >         error = -EINVAL;
> >         errorf(fc, "Mount credentials are from non init user
> > namespace and ID mapping is enabled. This is not allowed.");
> >         goto error;
> > }
> > 
> > (and making it so we can call idmap_userns)
> > 
> 
> Yes. That would be acceptable. Again, though, I'd like to see the
> dprintk()s gone.
> 

I can drop the dprintks, but given this is a uapi change, does it make sense to 
pr_info_once? Especially, because this can have security impact?

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