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Date:   Fri, 13 Nov 2020 23:19:54 +0100
From:   Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
To:     Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:     Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
        Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
        Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>,
        Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@...gle.com>,
        Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@....com>,
        Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@....com>,
        kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH mm v3 04/19] kasan, arm64: unpoison stack only with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK

There's a config option CONFIG_KASAN_STACK that has to be enabled for
KASAN to use stack instrumentation and perform validity checks for
stack variables.

There's no need to unpoison stack when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is not enabled.
Only call kasan_unpoison_task_stack[_below]() when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is
enabled.

Note, that CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is an option that is currently always
defined when CONFIG_KASAN is enabled, and therefore has to be tested
with #if instead of #ifdef.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/If8a891e9fe01ea543e00b576852685afec0887e3
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S        |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S |  2 +-
 include/linux/kasan.h            | 10 ++++++----
 mm/kasan/common.c                |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
index ba40d57757d6..bdadfa56b40e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(_cpu_resume)
 	 */
 	bl	cpu_do_resume
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
 	mov	x0, sp
 	bl	kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
index c8daa92f38dc..5d3a0b8fd379 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/wakeup_64.S
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(do_suspend_lowlevel)
 	movq	pt_regs_r14(%rax), %r14
 	movq	pt_regs_r15(%rax), %r15
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
 	/*
 	 * The suspend path may have poisoned some areas deeper in the stack,
 	 * which we now need to unpoison.
diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
index 0c89e6fdd29e..f2109bf0c5f9 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -76,8 +76,6 @@ static inline void kasan_disable_current(void) {}
 
 void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size);
 
-void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
-
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
 
@@ -122,8 +120,6 @@ void kasan_restore_multi_shot(bool enabled);
 
 static inline void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size) {}
 
-static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
-
 static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
 
@@ -175,6 +171,12 @@ static inline size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache) { return 0; }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) && CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
+void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task);
+#else
+static inline void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) {}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
 
 void kasan_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *cache);
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 0a420f1dbc54..7648a2452a01 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size)
 	unpoison_range(address, size);
 }
 
+#if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
 static void __kasan_unpoison_stack(struct task_struct *task, const void *sp)
 {
 	void *base = task_stack_page(task);
@@ -90,6 +91,7 @@ asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
 
 	unpoison_range(base, watermark - base);
 }
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK */
 
 void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
 {
-- 
2.29.2.299.gdc1121823c-goog

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