linux-kernel - [PATCH] random: Use arch_get_random_long_early() for init_std

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Message-Id: <20201113161912.62068-1-andre.przywara@arm.com>
Date:   Fri, 13 Nov 2020 16:19:12 +0000
From:   Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@....com>
To:     Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Cc:     Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] random: Use arch_get_random_long_early() for init_std_data()

In commit 253d3194c2b5 ("random: add arch_get_random_*long_early()") we
introduced _early versions of arch_get_random_long(), that are used on
arm64 to use the CPU RNDR instruction early in the boot process, before
we have established system-wide availability.
This covers the calls in crng_initialize_primary(), but missed the calls
in init_std_data(), happening just before that.

Use the _early versions of the arch_get_random* calls also in
init_std_data(), to help initialising the pool with proper seed values.

Fixes: 253d3194c2b5 ("random: add arch_get_random_*long_early()")
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@....com>
---
 drivers/char/random.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 2a41b21623ae..43bb331a67bd 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1778,8 +1778,8 @@ static void __init init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
 
 	mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now));
 	for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
-		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
-		    !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
+		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) &&
+		    !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv))
 			rv = random_get_entropy();
 		mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv, sizeof(rv));
 	}
-- 
2.17.1