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Message-ID: <d0e4819b-87b8-ef6f-9ede-adc28e10b2f8@redhat.com>
Date: Sun, 15 Nov 2020 06:20:05 -0800
From: Tom Rix <trix@...hat.com>
To: Russ Weight <russell.h.weight@...el.com>, mdf@...nel.org,
lee.jones@...aro.org, linux-fpga@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: lgoncalv@...hat.com, yilun.xu@...el.com, hao.wu@...el.com,
matthew.gerlach@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 6/6] fpga: m10bmc-sec: add max10 get_hw_errinfo
callback func
On 11/13/20 4:55 PM, Russ Weight wrote:
> Extend the MAX10 BMC Secure Update driver to include
> a function that returns 64 bits of additional HW specific
> data for errors that require additional information.
> This callback function enables the hw_errinfo sysfs
> node in the Intel Security Manager class driver.
>
> Signed-off-by: Russ Weight <russell.h.weight@...el.com>
> ---
> v5:
> - No change
> v4:
> - No change
> v3:
> - Changed: iops -> sops, imgr -> smgr, IFPGA_ -> FPGA_, ifpga_ to fpga_
> - Changed "MAX10 BMC Secure Engine driver" to "MAX10 BMC Secure Update
> driver"
> v2:
> - Implemented HW_ERRINFO_POISON for m10bmc_sec_hw_errinfo() to
> ensure that corresponding bits are set to 1 if we are unable
> to read the doorbell or auth_result registers.
> - Added m10bmc_ prefix to functions in m10bmc_iops structure
> ---
> drivers/fpga/intel-m10-bmc-secure.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/fpga/intel-m10-bmc-secure.c b/drivers/fpga/intel-m10-bmc-secure.c
> index 4fa8a2256088..a024efb173d3 100644
> --- a/drivers/fpga/intel-m10-bmc-secure.c
> +++ b/drivers/fpga/intel-m10-bmc-secure.c
> @@ -472,11 +472,36 @@ static enum fpga_sec_err m10bmc_sec_cancel(struct fpga_sec_mgr *smgr)
> return ret ? FPGA_SEC_ERR_RW_ERROR : FPGA_SEC_ERR_NONE;
> }
>
> +#define HW_ERRINFO_POISON GENMASK(31, 0)
> +static u64 m10bmc_sec_hw_errinfo(struct fpga_sec_mgr *smgr)
> +{
> + struct m10bmc_sec *sec = smgr->priv;
> + u32 doorbell, auth_result;
If doorbell and auth_result were poisoned at initialization, the if-checks could be skipped.
Tom
> +
> + switch (smgr->err_code) {
> + case FPGA_SEC_ERR_HW_ERROR:
> + case FPGA_SEC_ERR_TIMEOUT:
> + case FPGA_SEC_ERR_BUSY:
> + case FPGA_SEC_ERR_WEAROUT:
> + if (m10bmc_sys_read(sec->m10bmc, M10BMC_DOORBELL, &doorbell))
> + doorbell = HW_ERRINFO_POISON;
> +
> + if (m10bmc_sys_read(sec->m10bmc, M10BMC_AUTH_RESULT,
> + &auth_result))
> + auth_result = HW_ERRINFO_POISON;
> +
> + return (u64)doorbell << 32 | (u64)auth_result;
> + default:
> + return 0;
> + }
> +}
> +
> static const struct fpga_sec_mgr_ops m10bmc_sops = {
> .prepare = m10bmc_sec_prepare,
> .write_blk = m10bmc_sec_write_blk,
> .poll_complete = m10bmc_sec_poll_complete,
> .cancel = m10bmc_sec_cancel,
> + .get_hw_errinfo = m10bmc_sec_hw_errinfo,
> };
>
> static int m10bmc_secure_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
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