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Message-ID: <20201115085307.GV4758@kernel.org>
Date: Sun, 15 Nov 2020 10:53:07 +0200
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
To: Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
linux-nvdimm@...ts.01.org, linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org,
x86@...nel.org, Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@...u.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 4/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create
"secret" memory areas
On Fri, Nov 13, 2020 at 01:58:48PM +0000, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 10, 2020 at 05:14:39PM +0200, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > +static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
> > +{
> > + struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
> > + struct inode *inode = file_inode(vmf->vma->vm_file);
> > + pgoff_t offset = vmf->pgoff;
> > + unsigned long addr;
> > + struct page *page;
> > + int ret = 0;
> > +
> > + if (((loff_t)vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) >= i_size_read(inode))
> > + return vmf_error(-EINVAL);
> > +
> > + page = find_get_entry(mapping, offset);
>
> Why did you decide to use find_get_entry() here? You don't handle
> swap or shadow entries.
Right, I've missed that.
> > + if (!page) {
> > + page = secretmem_alloc_page(vmf->gfp_mask);
> > + if (!page)
> > + return vmf_error(-EINVAL);
>
> Why is this EINVAL and not ENOMEM?
Ah, I was annoyed by OOMs I got when I simulated various allocation
failures, so I changed it to get SIGBUS instead and than forgot to restore.
Will fix.
> > + ret = add_to_page_cache(page, mapping, offset, vmf->gfp_mask);
> > + if (unlikely(ret))
> > + goto err_put_page;
> > +
> > + ret = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, 1);
> > + if (ret)
> > + goto err_del_page_cache;
> > +
> > + addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
> > + flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE);
> > +
> > + __SetPageUptodate(page);
> > +
> > + ret = VM_FAULT_LOCKED;
> > + }
> > +
> > + vmf->page = page;
> > + return ret;
>
> Does sparse not warn you about this abuse of vm_fault_t? Separate out
> 'ret' and 'err'.
Will fix.
> Andrew, please fold in this fix. I suspect Mike will want to fix
> the other things I mention above.
>
> diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
> index 3dfdbd85ba00..09ca27f21661 100644
> --- a/mm/secretmem.c
> +++ b/mm/secretmem.c
> @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
> if (((loff_t)vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) >= i_size_read(inode))
> return vmf_error(-EINVAL);
>
> - page = find_get_entry(mapping, offset);
> + page = find_get_page(mapping, offset);
> if (!page) {
> page = secretmem_alloc_page(ctx, vmf->gfp_mask);
> if (!page)
--
Sincerely yours,
Mike.
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