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Message-Id: <20201116144757.1920077-19-alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2020 15:47:54 +0100
From: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>
To: tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de, hpa@...or.com,
x86@...nel.org, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, luto@...nel.org,
peterz@...radead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
thomas.lendacky@....com, jroedel@...e.de
Cc: konrad.wilk@...cle.com, jan.setjeeilers@...cle.com,
junaids@...gle.com, oweisse@...gle.com, rppt@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
graf@...zon.de, mgross@...ux.intel.com, kuzuno@...il.com,
alexandre.chartre@...cle.com
Subject: [RFC][PATCH v2 18/21] x86/pti: Execute NMI handler on the kernel stack
After a NMI from userland, the kernel is entered and it switches
the stack to the PTI stack which is mapped both in the kernel and in
the user page-table. When executing the NMI handler, switch to the
kernel stack (which is mapped only in the kernel page-table) so that
no kernel data leak to the userland through the stack.
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
index 4bc77aaf1303..be0f654c3095 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
@@ -506,8 +506,18 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_nmi)
inc_irq_stat(__nmi_count);
- if (!ignore_nmis)
- default_do_nmi(regs);
+ if (!ignore_nmis) {
+ if (user_mode(regs)) {
+ /*
+ * If we come from userland then we are on the
+ * trampoline stack, switch to the kernel stack
+ * to execute the NMI handler.
+ */
+ run_idt(default_do_nmi, regs);
+ } else {
+ default_do_nmi(regs);
+ }
+ }
idtentry_exit_nmi(regs, irq_state);
--
2.18.4
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