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Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2020 19:28:09 +0100 From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de> To: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com> Cc: tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, hpa@...or.com, x86@...nel.org, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, luto@...nel.org, peterz@...radead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@....com, jroedel@...e.de, konrad.wilk@...cle.com, jan.setjeeilers@...cle.com, junaids@...gle.com, oweisse@...gle.com, rppt@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, graf@...zon.de, mgross@...ux.intel.com, kuzuno@...il.com Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 00/21] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 07:12:07PM +0100, Alexandre Chartre wrote: > Yes. L1TF/MDS allow some inter cpu-thread attacks which are not mitigated at > the moment. In particular, this allows a guest VM to attack another guest VM > or the host kernel running on a sibling cpu-thread. Core Scheduling will > mitigate the guest-to-guest attack but not the guest-to-host attack. I see in vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(): /* L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS */ if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush)) vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu); else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear)) mds_clear_cpu_buffers(); Is that not enough? -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
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