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Message-ID: <20201117182809.GK5719@zn.tnic>
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2020 19:28:09 +0100
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>
Cc: tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, hpa@...or.com,
x86@...nel.org, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, luto@...nel.org,
peterz@...radead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
thomas.lendacky@....com, jroedel@...e.de, konrad.wilk@...cle.com,
jan.setjeeilers@...cle.com, junaids@...gle.com, oweisse@...gle.com,
rppt@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, graf@...zon.de, mgross@...ux.intel.com,
kuzuno@...il.com
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 00/21] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code
On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 07:12:07PM +0100, Alexandre Chartre wrote:
> Yes. L1TF/MDS allow some inter cpu-thread attacks which are not mitigated at
> the moment. In particular, this allows a guest VM to attack another guest VM
> or the host kernel running on a sibling cpu-thread. Core Scheduling will
> mitigate the guest-to-guest attack but not the guest-to-host attack.
I see in vmx_vcpu_enter_exit():
/* L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS */
if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear))
mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
Is that not enough?
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
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