linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v7] tcp: fix race condition when creating child sockets from syncookies

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Message-ID: <CANn89i+WL9G0vsr4HYJc==g0R+=cRPP7MkVZb120M5S4Q+NLbA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 19 Nov 2020 20:45:29 +0100
From:   Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
To:     Ricardo Dias <rdias@...glestore.com>
Cc:     David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@....inr.ac.ru>,
        Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org>,
        netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7] tcp: fix race condition when creating child sockets
 from syncookies

On Thu, Nov 19, 2020 at 8:24 PM Ricardo Dias <rdias@...glestore.com> wrote:
>
> When the TCP stack is in SYN flood mode, the server child socket is
> created from the SYN cookie received in a TCP packet with the ACK flag
> set.
>
> The child socket is created when the server receives the first TCP
> packet with a valid SYN cookie from the client. Usually, this packet
> corresponds to the final step of the TCP 3-way handshake, the ACK
> packet. But is also possible to receive a valid SYN cookie from the
> first TCP data packet sent by the client, and thus create a child socket
> from that SYN cookie.
>
> Since a client socket is ready to send data as soon as it receives the
> SYN+ACK packet from the server, the client can send the ACK packet (sent
> by the TCP stack code), and the first data packet (sent by the userspace
> program) almost at the same time, and thus the server will equally
> receive the two TCP packets with valid SYN cookies almost at the same
> instant.
>
> When such event happens, the TCP stack code has a race condition that
> occurs between the momement a lookup is done to the established
> connections hashtable to check for the existence of a connection for the
> same client, and the moment that the child socket is added to the
> established connections hashtable. As a consequence, this race condition
> can lead to a situation where we add two child sockets to the
> established connections hashtable and deliver two sockets to the
> userspace program to the same client.
>
> This patch fixes the race condition by checking if an existing child
> socket exists for the same client when we are adding the second child
> socket to the established connections socket. If an existing child
> socket exists, we return that socket and use it to process the TCP
> packet received, and discard the second child socket to the same client.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ricardo Dias <rdias@...glestore.com>
> ---
> v7 (2020-11-19):
>   * Changed the approach to re-use the first (existing) socket created
>     from thge syncookie. Instead of returning the existing socket in
>     tcp_(v4|v6)_syn_recv_sock and continue the protocol state machine
>     execution, tcp_(v4|v6)_syn_recv_sock signals that already exists a
>     socket, and tells tcp_(v4|v6)_rcv to lookup the socket again in the
>     established connections table.
>     This new approach fixes the errors reported by Eric for the previous
>     version of the patch.
>   * Also fixes the memory leaks by making sure that the newly created
>     socket in syn_recv_sock is destroyed in case an already existing
>     socket exists.

I think this is going too far. Your patch is too complex/risky, and
will be hard to backport to old kernels, because TCP stack has changed
a lot.

Alternative approach would be to detect the race and simply drop the
packet that lost the battle.