linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v4] mm: Optional full ASLR for mmap() and mremap()

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Message-ID: <20201120152716.GA4327@casper.infradead.org>
Date:   Fri, 20 Nov 2020 15:27:16 +0000
From:   Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>
To:     Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@...il.com>
Cc:     Cristiano Giuffrida <c.giuffrida@...nl>,
        Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>,
        "linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org" <linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org>,
        "akpm@...ux-foundation.org" <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        "linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] mm: Optional full ASLR for mmap() and mremap()

On Fri, Nov 20, 2020 at 10:38:21AM +0200, Topi Miettinen wrote:
> On 20.11.2020 0.20, Cristiano Giuffrida wrote:
> > Indeed it's nontrivial to get similar randomization guarantees for the
> > kernel. I mentioned TagBleed because similar combined AnC + TLB
> > attacks should also be possible in the browser. We just happened to
> > focus on the kernel with TagBleed.
> 
> Perhaps kernel objects could be also compiled as relocatable shared objects,
> like shared libraries for user applications, so that a they could be
> relocated independently away from the base address of main kernel. Also
> compiling the kernel with -mcmodel=large could allow various segments (code,
> rodata, data) to be located more freely. These would make the attacker to do
> more probing. Again, pointers between the objects may make these less
> useful.

They are relocatable shared objects.  They're loaded into the vmalloc
area on some architectures but x86 has a special MODULES_VADDR region.
Maybe just jumbling them into the general vmalloc address range would be
beneficial from a security point of view?  I suspect it's not all
that useful because most modules are loaded early on.

We seem to have randomness mixed into the vmalloc allocations with
DEBUG_AUGMENT_LOWEST_MATCH_CHECK, but there doesn't seem to be an
ASLR option to vmalloc ... Uladzislau?