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Message-Id: <20201120180426.922572-8-mic@digikod.net>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2020 19:04:24 +0100
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v1 7/9] certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ux.microsoft.com>
Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user
to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring. This enables to
invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or
from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain. This also enables to
add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.
Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been
trusted is a sensitive operation. This is why adding new hashes to the
blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and
vouched by the builtin trusted keyring. A blacklist hash is stored as a
key description. The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be
provided as the key payload.
Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system
is running. It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.
Update blacklist keyring and blacklist key access rights:
* allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which
make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
* forbids key update;
* restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the
root user rights.
See the help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh provided by a
following commit.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ux.microsoft.com>
---
certs/Kconfig | 10 ++++++
certs/blacklist.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
2 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig
index c94e93d8bccf..35fe9989e7b9 100644
--- a/certs/Kconfig
+++ b/certs/Kconfig
@@ -83,4 +83,14 @@ config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST
wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel. Each <hash> should
be a string of hex digits.
+config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE
+ bool "Allow root to add signed blacklist keys"
+ depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+ depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+ help
+ If set, provide the ability to load new blacklist keys at run time if
+ they are signed and vouched by a certificate from the builtin trusted
+ keyring. The PKCS#7 signature of the description is set in the key
+ payload. Blacklist keys cannot be removed.
+
endmenu
diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c
index d1e2f69d91c2..e869a23f38de 100644
--- a/certs/blacklist.c
+++ b/certs/blacklist.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include "blacklist.h"
@@ -24,6 +25,9 @@
*/
#define MAX_HASH_LEN 128
+#define BLACKLIST_KEY_PERM (KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_VIEW | \
+ KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_VIEW)
+
static const char tbs_prefix[] = "tbs";
static const char bin_prefix[] = "bin";
@@ -73,19 +77,46 @@ static int blacklist_vet_description(const char *desc)
return 0;
}
-/*
- * The hash to be blacklisted is expected to be in the description. There will
- * be no payload.
- */
-static int blacklist_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+static int blacklist_key_instantiate(struct key *key,
+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- if (prep->datalen > 0)
- return -EINVAL;
- return 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE
+ int err;
+#endif
+
+ /* Sets safe default permissions for keys loaded by user space. */
+ key->perm = BLACKLIST_KEY_PERM;
+
+ /*
+ * Skips the authentication step for builtin hashes, they are not
+ * signed but still trusted.
+ */
+ if (key->flags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN))
+ goto out;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE
+ /*
+ * Verifies the description's PKCS#7 signature against the builtin
+ * trusted keyring.
+ */
+ err = verify_pkcs7_signature(key->description,
+ strlen(key->description), prep->data, prep->datalen,
+ NULL, VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+#else
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return -EPERM;
+#endif
+
+out:
+ return generic_key_instantiate(key, prep);
}
-static void blacklist_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+static int blacklist_key_update(struct key *key,
+ struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
+ return -EPERM;
}
static void blacklist_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
@@ -96,9 +127,8 @@ static void blacklist_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
static struct key_type key_type_blacklist = {
.name = "blacklist",
.vet_description = blacklist_vet_description,
- .preparse = blacklist_preparse,
- .free_preparse = blacklist_free_preparse,
- .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
+ .instantiate = blacklist_key_instantiate,
+ .update = blacklist_key_update,
.describe = blacklist_describe,
};
@@ -147,8 +177,7 @@ static int mark_raw_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)
hash,
NULL,
0,
- ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW),
+ BLACKLIST_KEY_PERM,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
@@ -207,25 +236,43 @@ int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_binary_blacklisted);
+static int restrict_link_for_blacklist(struct key *dest_keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type, const union key_payload *payload,
+ struct key *restrict_key)
+{
+ if (type != &key_type_blacklist)
+ return -EPERM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Initialise the blacklist
*/
static int __init blacklist_init(void)
{
const char *const *bl;
+ struct key_restriction *restriction;
if (register_key_type(&key_type_blacklist) < 0)
panic("Can't allocate system blacklist key type\n");
+ restriction = kzalloc(sizeof(*restriction), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!restriction)
+ panic("Can't allocate blacklist keyring restriction\n");
+ restriction->check = restrict_link_for_blacklist;
+
blacklist_keyring =
keyring_alloc(".blacklist",
KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
current_cred(),
- (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
- KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
- KEY_USR_SEARCH,
- KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
- NULL, NULL);
+ KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH |
+ KEY_POS_WRITE |
+ KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE
+ | KEY_USR_WRITE
+#endif
+ , KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
+ restriction, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(blacklist_keyring))
panic("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n");
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &blacklist_keyring->flags);
--
2.29.2
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