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Message-ID: <7990c489ed6fb3ae36978820400b7cf60c55c126.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2020 14:49:10 -0500
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
Cc: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@...ux.microsoft.com>,
stephen.smalley.work@...il.com, casey@...aufler-ca.com,
agk@...hat.com, snitzer@...hat.com, gmazyland@...il.com,
paul@...l-moore.com, tyhicks@...ux.microsoft.com,
sashal@...nel.org, jmorris@...ei.org, nramas@...ux.microsoft.com,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, dm-devel@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity
critical data
On Mon, 2020-11-23 at 18:18 +0100, Pavel Machek wrote:
> > > Basically every other data structure in kernel is "critical" by your
> > > definition, and you can't really measure them all; some of them change
> > > rather often. Going piecemeal does not really help here.
> >
> > Agreed, measuring data structures that change is not really applicable.
> > However, measuring data structures that once initialized don't change,
> > does make sense (similar concept to __ro_after_init). The attestation
> > server doesn't need to know anything about the measurement, other than
> > more than a single measurement is indicative of a problem.
>
> So, why not simply measure everything that is ro_after_init?
I guess we could, but the original discussion, a long time ago prior to
LSM stacking, was limited to measuring the LSM hooks.
Mimi
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