linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v5 0/2] MTE support for KVM guest

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Message-ID: <20201123121611.GG3022@work-vm>
Date:   Mon, 23 Nov 2020 12:16:11 +0000
From:   "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@...hat.com>
To:     Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@...aro.org>
Cc:     Steven Price <steven.price@....com>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        James Morse <james.morse@....com>,
        Julien Thierry <julien.thierry.kdev@...il.com>,
        Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@....com>,
        kvmarm <kvmarm@...ts.cs.columbia.edu>,
        arm-mail-list <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
        lkml - Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        QEMU Developers <qemu-devel@...gnu.org>,
        Juan Quintela <quintela@...hat.com>,
        Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@...aro.org>,
        Haibo Xu <Haibo.Xu@....com>, Andrew Jones <drjones@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/2] MTE support for KVM guest

* Peter Maydell (peter.maydell@...aro.org) wrote:
> On Thu, 19 Nov 2020 at 15:39, Steven Price <steven.price@....com> wrote:
> > This series adds support for Arm's Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) to
> > KVM, allowing KVM guests to make use of it. This builds on the existing
> > user space support already in v5.10-rc1, see [1] for an overview.
> 
> > The change to require the VMM to map all guest memory PROT_MTE is
> > significant as it means that the VMM has to deal with the MTE tags even
> > if it doesn't care about them (e.g. for virtual devices or if the VMM
> > doesn't support migration). Also unfortunately because the VMM can
> > change the memory layout at any time the check for PROT_MTE/VM_MTE has
> > to be done very late (at the point of faulting pages into stage 2).
> 
> I'm a bit dubious about requring the VMM to map the guest memory
> PROT_MTE unless somebody's done at least a sketch of the design
> for how this would work on the QEMU side. Currently QEMU just
> assumes the guest memory is guest memory and it can access it
> without special precautions...

Although that is also changing because of the encrypted/protected memory
in things like SEV.

Dave

> thanks
> -- PMM
> 
-- 
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@...hat.com / Manchester, UK