linux-kernel - RE: [PATCH] vfio iommu type1: Bypass the vma permission check in vfio_pin_pages

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Message-ID: <AM6PR08MB32248D873EDD8923675F2D3BF7FC0@AM6PR08MB3224.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com>
Date:   Mon, 23 Nov 2020 02:37:32 +0000
From:   Justin He <Justin.He@....com>
To:     Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>
CC:     Cornelia Huck <cohuck@...hat.com>,
        "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [PATCH] vfio iommu type1: Bypass the vma permission check in
 vfio_pin_pages_remote()

Hi Alex, thanks for the comments.
See mine below:

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>
> Sent: Friday, November 20, 2020 1:05 AM
> To: Justin He <Justin.He@....com>
> Cc: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@...hat.com>; kvm@...r.kernel.org; linux-
> kernel@...r.kernel.org
> Subject: Re: [PATCH] vfio iommu type1: Bypass the vma permission check in
> vfio_pin_pages_remote()
>
> On Thu, 19 Nov 2020 22:27:37 +0800
> Jia He <justin.he@....com> wrote:
>
> > The permission of vfio iommu is different and incompatible with vma
> > permission. If the iotlb->perm is IOMMU_NONE (e.g. qemu side), qemu will
> > simply call unmap ioctl() instead of mapping. Hence vfio_dma_map() can't
> > map a dma region with NONE permission.
> >
> > This corner case will be exposed in coming virtio_fs cache_size
> > commit [1]
> >  - mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
> >    memory_region_init_ram_ptr()
> >  - re-mmap the above area with read/write authority.
> >  - vfio_dma_map() will be invoked when vfio device is hotplug added.
> >
> > qemu:
> > vfio_listener_region_add()
> > vfio_dma_map(..., readonly=false)
> > map.flags is set to VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ|VFIO_..._WRITE
> > ioctl(VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA)
> >
> > kernel:
> > vfio_dma_do_map()
> > vfio_pin_map_dma()
> > vfio_pin_pages_remote()
> > vaddr_get_pfn()
> > ...
> > check_vma_flags() failed! because
> > vm_flags hasn't VM_WRITE && gup_flags
> > has FOLL_WRITE
> >
> > It will report error in qemu log when hotplug adding(vfio) a nvme disk
> > to qemu guest on an Ampere EMAG server:
> > "VFIO_MAP_DMA failed: Bad address"
>
> I don't fully understand the argument here, I think this is suggesting
> that because QEMU won't call VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA on a region that has
> NONE permission, the kernel can ignore read/write permission by using
> FOLL_FORCE.  Not only is QEMU not the only userspace driver for vfio,
> but regardless of that, we can't trust the behavior of any given
> userspace driver.  Bypassing the permission check with FOLL_FORCE seems
> like it's placing the trust in the user, which seems like a security
> issue.  Thanks,
Yes, this might have side impact on security.
But besides this simple fix(adding FOLL_FORCE), do you think it is a good
idea that:
Qemu provides a special vfio_dma_map_none_perm() to allow mapping a
region with NONE permission?

Thanks for any suggestion.

--
Cheers,
Justin (Jia He)
>
> Alex
>
>
> > [1] https://gitlab.com/virtio-fs/qemu/-/blob/virtio-fs-
> dev/hw/virtio/vhost-user-fs.c#L502
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jia He <justin.he@....com>
> > ---
> >  drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c | 3 ++-
> >  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
> b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
> > index 67e827638995..33faa6b7dbd4 100644
> > --- a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
> > +++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
> > @@ -453,7 +453,8 @@ static int vaddr_get_pfn(struct mm_struct *mm,
> unsigned long vaddr,
> >  flags |= FOLL_WRITE;
> >
> >  mmap_read_lock(mm);
> > -ret = pin_user_pages_remote(mm, vaddr, 1, flags | FOLL_LONGTERM,
> > +ret = pin_user_pages_remote(mm, vaddr, 1,
> > +    flags | FOLL_LONGTERM | FOLL_FORCE,
> >      page, NULL, NULL);
> >  if (ret == 1) {
> >  *pfn = page_to_pfn(page[0]);

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