Message-ID: <e11e8b93-084b-8746-3e16-73dd4ee94147@huawei.com>
Date:   Tue, 24 Nov 2020 11:18:05 +0800
From:   yangerkun <yangerkun@...wei.com>
To:     <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <dja@...ens.net>,
        <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, <npiggin@...il.com>
CC:     <stable-commits@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Patch "powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses" has been added
 to the 4.4-stable tree



在 2020/11/20 15:30, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org 写道:
> 
> This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
> 
>      powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses
> 
> to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
>      http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
> 
> The filename of the patch is:
>       powerpc-64s-flush-l1d-after-user-accesses.patch
> and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.
> 
> If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
> please let <stable@...r.kernel.org> know about it.
> 
> 
>>>From foo@baz Fri Nov 20 08:28:41 AM CET 2020
> From: Daniel Axtens <dja@...ens.net>
> Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2020 11:07:04 +1100
> Subject: powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses
> To: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: dja@...ens.net
> Message-ID: <20201120000704.374811-9-dja@...ens.net>
> 
> From: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@...il.com>
> 
> commit 9a32a7e78bd0cd9a9b6332cbdc345ee5ffd0c5de upstream.
> 
> IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before
> it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible
> for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method,
> since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures
> to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked.
> 
> However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
> the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the
> attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel
> user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of
> Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility
> it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the
> privileged code to construct an attack.
> 
> This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries
> of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses.
> 
> This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@...il.com>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@...ens.net>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
> ---
>   Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt            |    4 +
>   arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h |   23 ++++++
>   arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h      |    9 ++
>   arch/powerpc/include/asm/kup.h                 |    4 +
>   arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h   |    3
>   arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h               |    1
>   arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S           |   86 +++++++------------------
>   arch/powerpc/kernel/ppc_ksyms.c                |    7 ++
>   arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c                 |   80 +++++++++++++++++++++++
>   arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S              |    7 ++
>   arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c              |   50 ++++++++++++++
>   arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c         |    7 +-
>   arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c         |    4 +
>   13 files changed, 224 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
>   create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h
> 
> --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -2197,6 +2197,7 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
>   					       mds=off [X86]
>   					       tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
>   					       no_entry_flush [PPC]
> +					       no_uaccess_flush [PPC]
>   
>   			auto (default)
>   				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
> @@ -2521,6 +2522,9 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
>   	nospec_store_bypass_disable
>   			[HW] Disable all mitigations for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability
>   
> +	no_uaccess_flush
> +			[PPC] Don't flush the L1-D cache after accessing user data.
> +
>   	noxsave		[BUGS=X86] Disables x86 extended register state save
>   			and restore using xsave. The kernel will fallback to
>   			enabling legacy floating-point and sse state.
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +#ifndef _ASM_POWERPC_BOOK3S_64_KUP_RADIX_H
> +#define _ASM_POWERPC_BOOK3S_64_KUP_RADIX_H
> +#include <linux/jump_label.h>
> +
> +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(uaccess_flush_key);
> +
> +/* Prototype for function defined in exceptions-64s.S */
> +void do_uaccess_flush(void);
> +
> +static __always_inline void allow_user_access(void __user *to, const void __user *from,
> +					      unsigned long size)
> +{
> +}
> +
> +static inline void prevent_user_access(void __user *to, const void __user *from,

Hi,

This will redefine prevent_user_access and lead to compile error...


In file included from arch/powerpc/kernel/ppc_ksyms.c:10:0:
./arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h:11:29: error: 
redefinition of 'allow_user_access'
  static __always_inline void allow_user_access(void __user *to, const 
void __user *from,
                              ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:12:0,
                  from arch/powerpc/kernel/ppc_ksyms.c:8:
./arch/powerpc/include/asm/kup.h:12:20: note: previous definition of 
'allow_user_access' was here
  static inline void allow_user_access(void __user *to, const void 
__user *from,
                     ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from arch/powerpc/kernel/ppc_ksyms.c:10:0:
./arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h:16:20: error: 
redefinition of 'prevent_user_access'
  static inline void prevent_user_access(void __user *to, const void 
__user *from,
                     ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:12:0,
                  from arch/powerpc/kernel/ppc_ksyms.c:8:
./arch/powerpc/include/asm/kup.h:14:20: note: previous definition of 
'prevent_user_access' was here
  static inline void prevent_user_access(void __user *to, const void 
__user *from,
                     ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:277: 
arch/powerpc/kernel/ppc_ksyms.o] Error 1
make[1]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....


Thanks,
Kun.



> +				       unsigned long size)
> +{
> +	if (static_branch_unlikely(&uaccess_flush_key))
> +		do_uaccess_flush();
> +}
> +
> +#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_BOOK3S_64_KUP_RADIX_H */
> --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h
> @@ -200,6 +200,14 @@ label##3:					       	\
>   	FTR_ENTRY_OFFSET 955b-956b;			\
>   	.popsection;
>   
> +#define UACCESS_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION			\
> +959:							\
> +	.pushsection __uaccess_flush_fixup,"a";		\
> +	.align 2;					\
> +960:							\
> +	FTR_ENTRY_OFFSET 959b-960b;			\
> +	.popsection;
> +
>   #define ENTRY_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION			\
>   957:							\
>   	.pushsection __entry_flush_fixup,"a";		\
> @@ -242,6 +250,7 @@ extern long stf_barrier_fallback;
>   extern long entry_flush_fallback;
>   extern long __start___stf_entry_barrier_fixup, __stop___stf_entry_barrier_fixup;
>   extern long __start___stf_exit_barrier_fixup, __stop___stf_exit_barrier_fixup;
> +extern long __start___uaccess_flush_fixup, __stop___uaccess_flush_fixup;
>   extern long __start___entry_flush_fixup, __stop___entry_flush_fixup;
>   extern long __start___rfi_flush_fixup, __stop___rfi_flush_fixup;
>   extern long __start___barrier_nospec_fixup, __stop___barrier_nospec_fixup;
> --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kup.h
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/kup.h
> @@ -6,10 +6,14 @@
>   
>   #include <asm/pgtable.h>
>   
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
> +#include <asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h>
> +#else
>   static inline void allow_user_access(void __user *to, const void __user *from,
>   				     unsigned long size) { }
>   static inline void prevent_user_access(void __user *to, const void __user *from,
>   				       unsigned long size) { }
> +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */
>   
>   static inline void allow_read_from_user(const void __user *from, unsigned long size)
>   {
> --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h
> @@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ static inline bool security_ftr_enabled(
>   // The L1-D cache should be flushed when entering the kernel
>   #define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY		0x0000000000004000ull
>   
> +// The L1-D cache should be flushed after user accesses from the kernel
> +#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS	0x0000000000008000ull
>   
>   // Features enabled by default
>   #define SEC_FTR_DEFAULT \
> @@ -94,6 +96,7 @@ static inline bool security_ftr_enabled(
>   	 SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR | \
>   	 SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR | \
>   	 SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY | \
> +	 SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS | \
>   	 SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY)
>   
>   #endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_SECURITY_FEATURES_H */
> --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h
> @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ void setup_barrier_nospec(void);
>   #else
>   static inline void setup_barrier_nospec(void) { };
>   #endif
> +void do_uaccess_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types);
>   void do_entry_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types);
>   void do_barrier_nospec_fixups(bool enable);
>   extern bool barrier_nospec_enabled;
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S
> @@ -1630,14 +1630,9 @@ stf_barrier_fallback:
>   	.endr
>   	blr
>   
> -	.globl rfi_flush_fallback
> -rfi_flush_fallback:
> -	SET_SCRATCH0(r13);
> -	GET_PACA(r13);
> -	std	r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
> -	std	r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
> -	std	r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
> -	mfctr	r9
> +
> +/* Clobbers r10, r11, ctr */
> +.macro L1D_DISPLACEMENT_FLUSH
>   	ld	r10,PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA(r13)
>   	ld	r11,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SIZE(r13)
>   	srdi	r11,r11,(7 + 3) /* 128 byte lines, unrolled 8x */
> @@ -1663,7 +1658,18 @@ rfi_flush_fallback:
>   	ld	r11,(0x80 + 8)*7(r10)
>   	addi	r10,r10,0x80*8
>   	bdnz	1b
> +.endm
> +
>   
> +	.globl rfi_flush_fallback
> +rfi_flush_fallback:
> +	SET_SCRATCH0(r13);
> +	GET_PACA(r13);
> +	std	r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
> +	std	r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
> +	std	r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
> +	mfctr	r9
> +	L1D_DISPLACEMENT_FLUSH
>   	mtctr	r9
>   	ld	r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
>   	ld	r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
> @@ -1679,32 +1685,7 @@ hrfi_flush_fallback:
>   	std	r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
>   	std	r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
>   	mfctr	r9
> -	ld	r10,PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA(r13)
> -	ld	r11,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SIZE(r13)
> -	srdi	r11,r11,(7 + 3) /* 128 byte lines, unrolled 8x */
> -	mtctr	r11
> -	DCBT_STOP_ALL_STREAM_IDS(r11) /* Stop prefetch streams */
> -
> -	/* order ld/st prior to dcbt stop all streams with flushing */
> -	sync
> -
> -	/*
> -	 * The load adresses are at staggered offsets within cachelines,
> -	 * which suits some pipelines better (on others it should not
> -	 * hurt).
> -	 */
> -1:
> -	ld	r11,(0x80 + 8)*0(r10)
> -	ld	r11,(0x80 + 8)*1(r10)
> -	ld	r11,(0x80 + 8)*2(r10)
> -	ld	r11,(0x80 + 8)*3(r10)
> -	ld	r11,(0x80 + 8)*4(r10)
> -	ld	r11,(0x80 + 8)*5(r10)
> -	ld	r11,(0x80 + 8)*6(r10)
> -	ld	r11,(0x80 + 8)*7(r10)
> -	addi	r10,r10,0x80*8
> -	bdnz	1b
> -
> +	L1D_DISPLACEMENT_FLUSH
>   	mtctr	r9
>   	ld	r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
>   	ld	r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
> @@ -1718,38 +1699,14 @@ entry_flush_fallback:
>   	std	r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
>   	std	r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
>   	mfctr	r9
> -	ld	r10,PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA(r13)
> -	ld	r11,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SIZE(r13)
> -	srdi	r11,r11,(7 + 3) /* 128 byte lines, unrolled 8x */
> -	mtctr	r11
> -	DCBT_STOP_ALL_STREAM_IDS(r11) /* Stop prefetch streams */
> -
> -	/* order ld/st prior to dcbt stop all streams with flushing */
> -	sync
> -
> -	/*
> -	 * The load addresses are at staggered offsets within cachelines,
> -	 * which suits some pipelines better (on others it should not
> -	 * hurt).
> -	 */
> -1:
> -	ld	r11,(0x80 + 8)*0(r10)
> -	ld	r11,(0x80 + 8)*1(r10)
> -	ld	r11,(0x80 + 8)*2(r10)
> -	ld	r11,(0x80 + 8)*3(r10)
> -	ld	r11,(0x80 + 8)*4(r10)
> -	ld	r11,(0x80 + 8)*5(r10)
> -	ld	r11,(0x80 + 8)*6(r10)
> -	ld	r11,(0x80 + 8)*7(r10)
> -	addi	r10,r10,0x80*8
> -	bdnz	1b
> -
> +	L1D_DISPLACEMENT_FLUSH
>   	mtctr	r9
>   	ld	r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
>   	ld	r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
>   	ld	r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
>   	blr
>   
> +
>   /*
>    * Hash table stuff
>    */
> @@ -1909,3 +1866,12 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_CFAR)
>   1:	addi	r3,r1,STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD
>   	bl	kernel_bad_stack
>   	b	1b
> +
> +_KPROBE(do_uaccess_flush)
> +	UACCESS_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION
> +	nop
> +	nop
> +	nop
> +	blr
> +	L1D_DISPLACEMENT_FLUSH
> +	blr
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ppc_ksyms.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ppc_ksyms.c
> @@ -6,6 +6,9 @@
>   #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
>   #include <asm/epapr_hcalls.h>
>   #include <asm/uaccess.h>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
> +#include <asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h>
> +#endif
>   
>   EXPORT_SYMBOL(flush_dcache_range);
>   EXPORT_SYMBOL(flush_icache_range);
> @@ -46,3 +49,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(epapr_hypercall_start);
>   EXPORT_SYMBOL(current_stack_pointer);
>   
>   EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_clear_user);
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(do_uaccess_flush);
> +#endif
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
> @@ -845,8 +845,12 @@ static enum l1d_flush_type enabled_flush
>   static void *l1d_flush_fallback_area;
>   static bool no_rfi_flush;
>   static bool no_entry_flush;
> +static bool no_uaccess_flush;
>   bool rfi_flush;
>   bool entry_flush;
> +bool uaccess_flush;
> +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(uaccess_flush_key);
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(uaccess_flush_key);
>   
>   static int __init handle_no_rfi_flush(char *p)
>   {
> @@ -864,6 +868,14 @@ static int __init handle_no_entry_flush(
>   }
>   early_param("no_entry_flush", handle_no_entry_flush);
>   
> +static int __init handle_no_uaccess_flush(char *p)
> +{
> +	pr_info("uaccess-flush: disabled on command line.");
> +	no_uaccess_flush = true;
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +early_param("no_uaccess_flush", handle_no_uaccess_flush);
> +
>   /*
>    * The RFI flush is not KPTI, but because users will see doco that says to use
>    * nopti we hijack that option here to also disable the RFI flush.
> @@ -907,6 +919,23 @@ void entry_flush_enable(bool enable)
>   	entry_flush = enable;
>   }
>   
> +void uaccess_flush_enable(bool enable)
> +{
> +	if (enable) {
> +		do_uaccess_flush_fixups(enabled_flush_types);
> +		if (static_key_initialized)
> +			static_branch_enable(&uaccess_flush_key);
> +		else
> +			printk(KERN_DEBUG "uaccess-flush: deferring static key until after static key initialization\n");
> +		on_each_cpu(do_nothing, NULL, 1);
> +	} else {
> +		static_branch_disable(&uaccess_flush_key);
> +		do_uaccess_flush_fixups(L1D_FLUSH_NONE);
> +	}
> +
> +	uaccess_flush = enable;
> +}
> +
>   static void __ref init_fallback_flush(void)
>   {
>   	u64 l1d_size, limit;
> @@ -961,6 +990,15 @@ void setup_entry_flush(bool enable)
>   		entry_flush_enable(enable);
>   }
>   
> +void setup_uaccess_flush(bool enable)
> +{
> +	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
> +		return;
> +
> +	if (!no_uaccess_flush)
> +		uaccess_flush_enable(enable);
> +}
> +
>   #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
>   static int rfi_flush_set(void *data, u64 val)
>   {
> @@ -1014,12 +1052,54 @@ static int entry_flush_get(void *data, u
>   
>   DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(fops_entry_flush, entry_flush_get, entry_flush_set, "%llu\n");
>   
> +static int uaccess_flush_set(void *data, u64 val)
> +{
> +	bool enable;
> +
> +	if (val == 1)
> +		enable = true;
> +	else if (val == 0)
> +		enable = false;
> +	else
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	/* Only do anything if we're changing state */
> +	if (enable != uaccess_flush)
> +		uaccess_flush_enable(enable);
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int uaccess_flush_get(void *data, u64 *val)
> +{
> +	*val = uaccess_flush ? 1 : 0;
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(fops_uaccess_flush, uaccess_flush_get, uaccess_flush_set, "%llu\n");
> +
> +
>   static __init int rfi_flush_debugfs_init(void)
>   {
>   	debugfs_create_file("rfi_flush", 0600, powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL, &fops_rfi_flush);
>   	debugfs_create_file("entry_flush", 0600, powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL, &fops_entry_flush);
> +	debugfs_create_file("uaccess_flush", 0600, powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL, &fops_uaccess_flush);
>   	return 0;
>   }
>   device_initcall(rfi_flush_debugfs_init);
>   #endif
> +
> +/*
> + * setup_uaccess_flush runs before jump_label_init, so we can't do the setup
> + * there. Do it now instead.
> + */
> +static __init int uaccess_flush_static_key_init(void)
> +{
> +	if (uaccess_flush) {
> +		printk(KERN_DEBUG "uaccess-flush: switching on static key\n");
> +		static_branch_enable(&uaccess_flush_key);
> +	}
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +early_initcall(uaccess_flush_static_key_init);
>   #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> @@ -81,6 +81,13 @@ SECTIONS
>   	}
>   
>   	. = ALIGN(8);
> +	__uaccess_flush_fixup : AT(ADDR(__uaccess_flush_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
> +		__start___uaccess_flush_fixup = .;
> +		*(__uaccess_flush_fixup)
> +		__stop___uaccess_flush_fixup = .;
> +	}
> +
> +	. = ALIGN(8);
>   	__entry_flush_fixup : AT(ADDR(__entry_flush_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
>   		__start___entry_flush_fixup = .;
>   		*(__entry_flush_fixup)
> --- a/arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c
> @@ -229,6 +229,56 @@ void do_stf_barrier_fixups(enum stf_barr
>   	do_stf_exit_barrier_fixups(types);
>   }
>   
> +void do_uaccess_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types)
> +{
> +	unsigned int instrs[4], *dest;
> +	long *start, *end;
> +	int i;
> +
> +	start = PTRRELOC(&__start___uaccess_flush_fixup);
> +	end = PTRRELOC(&__stop___uaccess_flush_fixup);
> +
> +	instrs[0] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
> +	instrs[1] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
> +	instrs[2] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
> +	instrs[3] = 0x4e800020; /* blr */
> +
> +	i = 0;
> +	if (types == L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK) {
> +		instrs[3] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
> +		/* fallthrough to fallback flush */
> +	}
> +
> +	if (types & L1D_FLUSH_ORI) {
> +		instrs[i++] = 0x63ff0000; /* ori 31,31,0 speculation barrier */
> +		instrs[i++] = 0x63de0000; /* ori 30,30,0 L1d flush*/
> +	}
> +
> +	if (types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG)
> +		instrs[i++] = 0x7c12dba6; /* mtspr TRIG2,r0 (SPR #882) */
> +
> +	for (i = 0; start < end; start++, i++) {
> +		dest = (void *)start + *start;
> +
> +		pr_devel("patching dest %lx\n", (unsigned long)dest);
> +
> +		patch_instruction(dest, instrs[0]);
> +
> +		patch_instruction((dest + 1), instrs[1]);
> +		patch_instruction((dest + 2), instrs[2]);
> +		patch_instruction((dest + 3), instrs[3]);
> +	}
> +
> +	printk(KERN_DEBUG "uaccess-flush: patched %d locations (%s flush)\n", i,
> +		(types == L1D_FLUSH_NONE)       ? "no" :
> +		(types == L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK)   ? "fallback displacement" :
> +		(types &  L1D_FLUSH_ORI)        ? (types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG)
> +							? "ori+mttrig type"
> +							: "ori type" :
> +		(types &  L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG)     ? "mttrig type"
> +						: "unknown");
> +}
> +
>   void do_entry_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types)
>   {
>   	unsigned int instrs[3], *dest;
> --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c
> @@ -126,9 +126,10 @@ static void pnv_setup_rfi_flush(void)
>   
>   	/*
>   	 * 4.4 doesn't support Power9 bare metal, so we don't need to flush
> -	 * here - the flush fixes a P9 specific vulnerability.
> +	 * here - the flushes fix a P9 specific vulnerability.
>   	 */
>   	security_ftr_clear(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY);
> +	security_ftr_clear(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS);
>   
>   	enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) && \
>   		 (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR)   || \
> @@ -140,6 +141,10 @@ static void pnv_setup_rfi_flush(void)
>   	enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
>   		 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY);
>   	setup_entry_flush(enable);
> +
> +	enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
> +		 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS);
> +	setup_uaccess_flush(enable);
>   }
>   
>   static void __init pnv_setup_arch(void)
> --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c
> @@ -588,6 +588,10 @@ void pseries_setup_rfi_flush(void)
>   	enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
>   		 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY);
>   	setup_entry_flush(enable);
> +
> +	enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
> +		 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS);
> +	setup_uaccess_flush(enable);
>   }
>   
>   static void __init pSeries_setup_arch(void)
> 
> 
> Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dja@...ens.net are
> 
> queue-4.4/powerpc-add-a-framework-for-user-access-tracking.patch
> queue-4.4/powerpc-implement-user_access_begin-and-friends.patch
> queue-4.4/powerpc-uaccess-evaluate-macro-arguments-once-before-user-access-is-allowed.patch
> queue-4.4/powerpc-64s-flush-l1d-after-user-accesses.patch
> queue-4.4/powerpc-64s-move-some-exception-handlers-out-of-line.patch
> queue-4.4/powerpc-64s-flush-l1d-on-kernel-entry.patch
> queue-4.4/powerpc-fix-__clear_user-with-kuap-enabled.patch
> queue-4.4/powerpc-64s-define-maskable_relon_exception_pseries_ool.patch
> .
> 

Powered by blists - more mailing lists