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Message-ID: <20201124092919.GI8537@kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 11:29:19 +0200
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
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Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
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"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>,
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"open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK"
<linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create
"secret" memory areas
On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 07:28:22AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 23, 2020 at 1:54 AM Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org> wrote:
> >
> > From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>
> >
> > Hi,
> >
> > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor.
> >
> > The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a
> > dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the
> > memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap()
> > of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret"
> > memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in
> > the direct map and will have desired protection bits set in the user page
> > table. For instance, current implementation allows uncached mappings.
>
> I'm still not ready to ACK uncached mappings on x86. I'm fine with
> the concept of allowing privileged users to create UC memory on x86
> for testing and experimentation, but it's a big can of worms in
> general.
Ok, let's move forward without UC.
--
Sincerely yours,
Mike.
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