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Message-ID: <20201124133719.GA30896@infradead.org>
Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 13:37:19 +0000
From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
To: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, dev@...ncontainers.org,
corbet@....net, Carlos O'Donell <carlos@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] syscalls: Document OCI seccomp filter interactions &
workaround
On Tue, Nov 24, 2020 at 01:08:20PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
> This documents a way to safely use new security-related system calls
> while preserving compatibility with container runtimes that require
> insecure emulation (because they filter the system call by default).
> Admittedly, it is somewhat hackish, but it can be implemented by
> userspace today, for existing system calls such as faccessat2,
> without kernel or container runtime changes.
I think this is completely insane. Tell the OCI folks to fix their
completely broken specification instead.
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