linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] kvm/x86/mmu: use the correct inherited permissions to get shadow page

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Message-ID: <0724aeb9-3466-5505-8f12-a5899144e68f@redhat.com>
Date:   Fri, 27 Nov 2020 17:48:50 +0100
From:   Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@...il.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        Lai Jiangshan <laijs@...ux.alibaba.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Avi Kivity <avi@...ranet.com>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kvm/x86/mmu: use the correct inherited permissions to get
 shadow page

On 26/11/20 01:05, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 20, 2020, Lai Jiangshan wrote:
>> From: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@...ux.alibaba.com>
>>
>> Commit 41074d07c78b ("KVM: MMU: Fix inherited permissions for emulated
>> guest pte updates") said role.access is common access permissions for
>> all ptes in this shadow page, which is the inherited permissions from
>> the parent ptes.
>>
>> But the commit did not enforce this definition when kvm_mmu_get_page()
>> is called in FNAME(fetch). Rather, it uses a random (last level pte's
>> combined) access permissions.
> 
> I wouldn't say it's random, the issue is specifically that all shadow pages end
> up using the combined set of permissions of the entire walk, as opposed to the
> only combined permissions of its parents.
> 
>> And the permissions won't be checked again in next FNAME(fetch) since the
>> spte is present. It might fail to meet guest's expectation when guest sets up
>> spaghetti pagetables.
> 
> Can you provide details on the exact failure scenario?  It would be very helpful
> for documentation and understanding.  I can see how using the full combined
> permissions will cause weirdness for upper level SPs in kvm_mmu_get_page(), but
> I'm struggling to connect the dots to understand how that will cause incorrect
> behavior for the guest.  AFAICT, outside of the SP cache, KVM only consumes
> role.access for the final/last SP.
> 

Agreed, a unit test would be even better, but just a description in the 
commit message would be enough.

Paolo