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Message-ID: <98e1b159-bf32-5c67-455b-f798023770ef@intel.com>
Date: Sat, 28 Nov 2020 08:23:59 -0800
From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
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Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 05/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode
Shadow Stack
On 11/27/2020 9:10 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 10, 2020 at 08:21:50AM -0800, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
>> +config X86_CET
>> + def_bool n
>> +
>> +config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
>> + def_bool n
>> +
>> +config X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER
>
> Is X86_SHADOW_STACK_KERNEL coming too?
>
> Regardless, you can add it when it comes and you can use only X86_CET
> for now and drop this one and simplify this pile of Kconfig symbols.
We have X86_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER too. My thought was, X86_CET means any
of kernel/user shadow stack/ibt.
>
>> + prompt "Intel Shadow Stacks for user-mode"
>> + def_bool n
>> + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
>> + depends on AS_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
>> + select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
>> + select X86_CET
>> + select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
>> + help
>> + Shadow Stacks provides protection against program stack
>> + corruption. It's a hardware feature. This only matters
>> + if you have the right hardware. It's a security hardening
>> + feature and apps must be enabled to use it. You get no
>> + protection "for free" on old userspace. The hardware can
>> + support user and kernel, but this option is for user space
>> + only.
>> + Support for this feature is only known to be present on
>> + processors released in 2020 or later. CET features are also
>> + known to increase kernel text size by 3.7 KB.
>
> This help text needs some rewriting. You can find an inspiration about
> more adequate style in that same Kconfig file.
>
I will work on it.
>> +
>> + If unsure, say N.
>> +
>> config EFI
>> bool "EFI runtime service support"
>> depends on ACPI
>> diff --git a/scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh b/scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh
>> new file mode 100755
>> index 000000000000..fac1d363a1b8
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/scripts/as-x86_64-has-shadow-stack.sh
>> @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
>> +#!/bin/sh
>> +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>> +
>> +echo "wrussq %rax, (%rbx)" | $* -x assembler -c -
>
> 2> /dev/null
>
> otherwise you get
>
> {standard input}: Assembler messages:
> {standard input}:1: Error: no such instruction: `wrussq %rax,(%rbx)
>
> on non-enlightened toolchains during build.
>
Yes, I will fix this in the next revision.
Yu-cheng
> Thx.
>
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