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Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2020 10:06:37 -0600 From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com> To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com> Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>, Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 00/35] SEV-ES hypervisor support On 11/30/20 9:31 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote: > On 16/09/20 02:19, Sean Christopherson wrote: >> >> TDX also selectively blocks/skips portions of other ioctl()s so that the >> TDX code itself can yell loudly if e.g. .get_cpl() is invoked. The event >> injection restrictions are due to direct injection not being allowed >> (except >> for NMIs); all IRQs have to be routed through APICv (posted interrupts) and >> exception injection is completely disallowed. >> >> kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_vcpu_events: >> if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.guest_state_protected) >> events->interrupt.shadow = >> kvm_x86_ops.get_interrupt_shadow(vcpu); > > Perhaps an alternative implementation can enter the vCPU with immediate > exit until no events are pending, and then return all zeroes? SEV-SNP has support for restricting injections, but SEV-ES does not. Perhaps a new boolean, guest_restricted_injection, can be used instead of basing it on guest_state_protected. Thanks, Tom > > Paolo >
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