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Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2020 12:55:02 -0500 From: Joel Fernandes <joel@...lfernandes.org> To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org> Cc: Nishanth Aravamudan <naravamudan@...italocean.com>, Julien Desfossez <jdesfossez@...italocean.com>, Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>, Vineeth Pillai <viremana@...ux.microsoft.com>, Aaron Lu <aaron.lwe@...il.com>, Aubrey Li <aubrey.intel@...il.com>, tglx@...utronix.de, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, mingo@...nel.org, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, fweisbec@...il.com, keescook@...omium.org, kerrnel@...gle.com, Phil Auld <pauld@...hat.com>, Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@....com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@...hsingularity.net>, Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, vineeth@...byteword.org, Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@...el.com>, Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>, Agata Gruza <agata.gruza@...el.com>, Antonio Gomez Iglesias <antonio.gomez.iglesias@...el.com>, graf@...zon.com, konrad.wilk@...cle.com, dfaggioli@...e.com, pjt@...gle.com, rostedt@...dmis.org, derkling@...gle.com, benbjiang@...cent.com, Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>, James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com, OWeisse@...ch.edu, Dhaval Giani <dhaval.giani@...cle.com>, Junaid Shahid <junaids@...gle.com>, jsbarnes@...gle.com, chris.hyser@...cle.com, Ben Segall <bsegall@...gle.com>, Josh Don <joshdon@...gle.com>, Hao Luo <haoluo@...gle.com>, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>, Aubrey Li <aubrey.li@...ux.intel.com>, Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...el.com>, "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH -tip 18/32] kernel/entry: Add support for core-wide protection of kernel-mode On Wed, Nov 25, 2020 at 10:37:00AM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 06:19:48PM -0500, Joel Fernandes (Google) wrote: > > Core-scheduling prevents hyperthreads in usermode from attacking each > > other, but it does not do anything about one of the hyperthreads > > entering the kernel for any reason. This leaves the door open for MDS > > and L1TF attacks with concurrent execution sequences between > > hyperthreads. > > > > This patch therefore adds support for protecting all syscall and IRQ > > kernel mode entries. Care is taken to track the outermost usermode exit > > and entry using per-cpu counters. In cases where one of the hyperthreads > > enter the kernel, no additional IPIs are sent. Further, IPIs are avoided > > when not needed - example: idle and non-cookie HTs do not need to be > > forced into kernel mode. > > > > More information about attacks: > > For MDS, it is possible for syscalls, IRQ and softirq handlers to leak > > data to either host or guest attackers. For L1TF, it is possible to leak > > to guest attackers. There is no possible mitigation involving flushing > > of buffers to avoid this since the execution of attacker and victims > > happen concurrently on 2 or more HTs. > > > .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 + > > include/linux/entry-common.h | 12 +- > > include/linux/sched.h | 12 + > > kernel/entry/common.c | 28 +- > > kernel/sched/core.c | 241 ++++++++++++++++++ > > kernel/sched/sched.h | 3 + > > 6 files changed, 304 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt > > index bd1a5b87a5e2..b185c6ed4aba 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt > > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt > > @@ -4678,6 +4678,17 @@ > > > > sbni= [NET] Granch SBNI12 leased line adapter > > > > + sched_core_protect_kernel= > > + [SCHED_CORE] Pause SMT siblings of a core running in > > + user mode, if at least one of the siblings of the core > > + is running in kernel mode. This is to guarantee that > > + kernel data is not leaked to tasks which are not trusted > > + by the kernel. A value of 0 disables protection, 1 > > + enables protection. The default is 1. Note that protection > > + depends on the arch defining the _TIF_UNSAFE_RET flag. > > + Further, for protecting VMEXIT, arch needs to call > > + KVM entry/exit hooks. > > + > > sched_debug [KNL] Enables verbose scheduler debug messages. > > > > schedstats= [KNL,X86] Enable or disable scheduled statistics. > > So I don't like the parameter name, it's too long. Also I don't like it > because its a boolean. Maybe ht_protect= then? > You're adding syscall,irq,kvm under a single knob where they're all due > to different flavours of broken. Different hardware might want/need > different combinations. Ok, I can try to make it ht_protect=irq,syscall,kvm etc. And conditionally enable the protection. Does that work for you? > > Hardware without MDS but with L1TF wouldn't need the syscall hook, but > you're not givng a choice here. And this is generic code, you can't > assume stuff like this. Got it. thanks, - Joel
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