linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.9 38/42] x86/speculation: Fix prctl() when spectre_v2

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <20201201084645.598458089@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Tue,  1 Dec 2020 09:53:36 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Anand K Mistry <amistry@...gle.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 38/42] x86/speculation: Fix prctl() when spectre_v2_user={seccomp,prctl},ibpb

From: Anand K Mistry <amistry@...gle.com>

commit 33fc379df76b4991e5ae312f07bcd6820811971e upstream.

When spectre_v2_user={seccomp,prctl},ibpb is specified on the command
line, IBPB is force-enabled and STIPB is conditionally-enabled (or not
available).

However, since

  21998a351512 ("x86/speculation: Avoid force-disabling IBPB based on STIBP and enhanced IBRS.")

the spectre_v2_user_ibpb variable is set to SPECTRE_V2_USER_{PRCTL,SECCOMP}
instead of SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT, which is the actual behaviour.
Because the issuing of IBPB relies on the switch_mm_*_ibpb static
branches, the mitigations behave as expected.

Since

  1978b3a53a74 ("x86/speculation: Allow IBPB to be conditionally enabled on CPUs with always-on STIBP")

this discrepency caused the misreporting of IB speculation via prctl().

On CPUs with STIBP always-on and spectre_v2_user=seccomp,ibpb,
prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL) would return PR_SPEC_PRCTL |
PR_SPEC_ENABLE instead of PR_SPEC_DISABLE since both IBPB and STIPB are
always on. It also allowed prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) to set the IB
speculation mode, even though the flag is ignored.

Similarly, for CPUs without SMT, prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL) should
also return PR_SPEC_DISABLE since IBPB is always on and STIBP is not
available.

 [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Fixes: 21998a351512 ("x86/speculation: Avoid force-disabling IBPB based on STIBP and enhanced IBRS.")
Fixes: 1978b3a53a74 ("x86/speculation: Allow IBPB to be conditionally enabled on CPUs with always-on STIBP")
Signed-off-by: Anand K Mistry <amistry@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Cc: <stable@...r.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201110123349.1.Id0cbf996d2151f4c143c90f9028651a5b49a5908@changeid
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -732,11 +732,13 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum s
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
 
+		spectre_v2_user_ibpb = mode;
 		switch (cmd) {
 		case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE:
 		case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB:
 		case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB:
 			static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_always_ibpb);
+			spectre_v2_user_ibpb = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT;
 			break;
 		case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL:
 		case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO:
@@ -750,8 +752,6 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum s
 		pr_info("mitigation: Enabling %s Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n",
 			static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb) ?
 			"always-on" : "conditional");
-
-		spectre_v2_user_ibpb = mode;
 	}
 
 	/*