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Message-ID: <24B3FA3A-CBA6-48F1-909F-521EFB57CAC2@amd.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 04:16:16 +0000
From: "Kalra, Ashish" <Ashish.Kalra@....com>
To: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@...gle.com>
CC: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
"Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@....com>,
X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, KVM list <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"Singh, Brijesh" <brijesh.singh@....com>,
"dovmurik@...ux.vnet.ibm.com" <dovmurik@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"tobin@....com" <tobin@....com>,
"jejb@...ux.ibm.com" <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
"frankeh@...ibm.com" <frankeh@...ibm.com>,
"dgilbert@...hat.com" <dgilbert@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/9] KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3
I don’t think that the bitmap by itself is really a performance bottleneck here.
Thanks,
Ashish
> On Dec 7, 2020, at 9:10 PM, Steve Rutherford <srutherford@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Dec 7, 2020 at 12:42 PM Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Sun, Dec 06, 2020, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>>> On 03/12/20 01:34, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>>> On Tue, Dec 01, 2020, Ashish Kalra wrote:
>>>>> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
>>>>>
>>>>> KVM hypercall framework relies on alternative framework to patch the
>>>>> VMCALL -> VMMCALL on AMD platform. If a hypercall is made before
>>>>> apply_alternative() is called then it defaults to VMCALL. The approach
>>>>> works fine on non SEV guest. A VMCALL would causes #UD, and hypervisor
>>>>> will be able to decode the instruction and do the right things. But
>>>>> when SEV is active, guest memory is encrypted with guest key and
>>>>> hypervisor will not be able to decode the instruction bytes.
>>>>>
>>>>> Add SEV specific hypercall3, it unconditionally uses VMMCALL. The hypercall
>>>>> will be used by the SEV guest to notify encrypted pages to the hypervisor.
>>>>
>>>> What if we invert KVM_HYPERCALL and X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL to default to VMMCALL
>>>> and opt into VMCALL? It's a synthetic feature flag either way, and I don't
>>>> think there are any existing KVM hypercalls that happen before alternatives are
>>>> patched, i.e. it'll be a nop for sane kernel builds.
>>>>
>>>> I'm also skeptical that a KVM specific hypercall is the right approach for the
>>>> encryption behavior, but I'll take that up in the patches later in the series.
>>>
>>> Do you think that it's the guest that should "donate" memory for the bitmap
>>> instead?
>>
>> No. Two things I'd like to explore:
>>
>> 1. Making the hypercall to announce/request private vs. shared common across
>> hypervisors (KVM, Hyper-V, VMware, etc...) and technologies (SEV-* and TDX).
>> I'm concerned that we'll end up with multiple hypercalls that do more or
>> less the same thing, e.g. KVM+SEV, Hyper-V+SEV, TDX, etc... Maybe it's a
>> pipe dream, but I'd like to at least explore options before shoving in KVM-
>> only hypercalls.
>>
>>
>> 2. Tracking shared memory via a list of ranges instead of a using bitmap to
>> track all of guest memory. For most use cases, the vast majority of guest
>> memory will be private, most ranges will be 2mb+, and conversions between
>> private and shared will be uncommon events, i.e. the overhead to walk and
>> split/merge list entries is hopefully not a big concern. I suspect a list
>> would consume far less memory, hopefully without impacting performance.
>
> For a fancier data structure, I'd suggest an interval tree. Linux
> already has an rbtree-based interval tree implementation, which would
> likely work, and would probably assuage any performance concerns.
>
> Something like this would not be worth doing unless most of the shared
> pages were physically contiguous. A sample Ubuntu 20.04 VM on GCP had
> 60ish discontiguous shared regions. This is by no means a thorough
> search, but it's suggestive. If this is typical, then the bitmap would
> be far less efficient than most any interval-based data structure.
>
> You'd have to allow userspace to upper bound the number of intervals
> (similar to the maximum bitmap size), to prevent host OOMs due to
> malicious guests. There's something nice about the guest donating
> memory for this, since that would eliminate the OOM risk.
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