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Message-Id: <20201209222320.1724-27-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2020 14:23:20 -0800
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
To: x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH v16 26/26] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack
There are three possible options to create a shadow stack allocation API:
an arch_prctl, a new syscall, or adding PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect().
Each has its advantages and compromises.
An arch_prctl() is the least intrusive. However, the existing x86
arch_prctl() takes only two parameters. Multiple parameters must be
passed in a memory buffer. There is a proposal to pass more parameters in
registers [1], but no active discussion on that.
A new syscall minimizes compatibility issues and offers an extensible frame
work to other architectures, but this will likely result in some overlap of
mmap()/mprotect().
The introduction of PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect() takes advantage of
existing APIs. The x86-specific PROT_SHSTK is translated to VM_SHSTK and
a shadow stack mapping is created without reinventing the wheel. There are
potential pitfalls though. The most obvious one would be using this as a
bypass to shadow stack protection. However, the attacker would have to get
to the syscall first.
Since arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() is modified, I have moved arch_vm_get_page
_prot() and arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to x86/include/asm/mman.h.
This will be more consistent with other architectures.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200828121624.108243-1-hjl.tools@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 28 ++---------
include/linux/mm.h | 1 +
mm/mmap.c | 8 ++-
4 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6cb7801edb4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_MMAN_H
+#define _ASM_X86_MMAN_H
+
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <uapi/asm/mman.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+/*
+ * Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags
+ * value and turn them in to the bits that we can put in
+ * to a pte.
+ *
+ * Only override these if Protection Keys are available
+ * (which is only on 64-bit).
+ */
+#define arch_vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags) __pgprot( \
+ ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT0 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \
+ ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT1 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \
+ ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \
+ ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
+
+#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) ( \
+ ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \
+ ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \
+ ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \
+ ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
+#else
+#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) (0)
+#endif
+
+static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot,
+ unsigned long pkey)
+{
+ unsigned long vm_prot_bits = pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey);
+
+ if (!(prot & PROT_WRITE) && (prot & PROT_SHSTK))
+ vm_prot_bits |= VM_SHSTK;
+
+ return vm_prot_bits;
+}
+#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET_USER
+static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr)
+{
+ unsigned long valid = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC | PROT_SEM;
+
+ if (prot & ~(valid | PROT_SHSTK))
+ return false;
+
+ if (prot & PROT_SHSTK) {
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+
+ if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_size)
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * A shadow stack mapping is indirectly writable by only
+ * the CALL and WRUSS instructions, but not other write
+ * instructions). PROT_SHSTK and PROT_WRITE are mutually
+ * exclusive.
+ */
+ if (prot & PROT_WRITE)
+ return false;
+
+ vma = find_vma(current->mm, addr);
+ if (!vma)
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * Shadow stack cannot be backed by a file or shared.
+ */
+ if (vma->vm_file || (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+#define arch_validate_prot arch_validate_prot
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
index d4a8d0424bfb..39bb7db344a6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
@@ -1,31 +1,11 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
-#ifndef _ASM_X86_MMAN_H
-#define _ASM_X86_MMAN_H
+#ifndef _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H
+#define _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H
#define MAP_32BIT 0x40 /* only give out 32bit addresses */
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
-/*
- * Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags
- * value and turn them in to the bits that we can put in
- * to a pte.
- *
- * Only override these if Protection Keys are available
- * (which is only on 64-bit).
- */
-#define arch_vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags) __pgprot( \
- ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT0 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \
- ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT1 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \
- ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \
- ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
-
-#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) ( \
- ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \
- ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \
- ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \
- ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
-#endif
+#define PROT_SHSTK 0x10 /* shadow stack pages */
#include <asm-generic/mman.h>
-#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
+#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 331058914b15..89d402e52442 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -334,6 +334,7 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
#if defined(CONFIG_X86)
# define VM_PAT VM_ARCH_1 /* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */
+# define VM_ARCH_CLEAR VM_SHSTK
#elif defined(CONFIG_PPC)
# define VM_SAO VM_ARCH_1 /* Strong Access Ordering (powerpc) */
#elif defined(CONFIG_PARISC)
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index c193c5d70197..ab1365106791 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1483,6 +1483,12 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
unsigned long flags_mask;
+ /*
+ * Call stack cannot be backed by a file.
+ */
+ if (vm_flags & VM_SHSTK)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (!file_mmap_ok(file, inode, pgoff, len))
return -EOVERFLOW;
@@ -1547,7 +1553,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
} else {
switch (flags & MAP_TYPE) {
case MAP_SHARED:
- if (vm_flags & (VM_GROWSDOWN|VM_GROWSUP))
+ if (vm_flags & (VM_GROWSDOWN|VM_GROWSUP|VM_SHSTK))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Ignore pgoff.
--
2.21.0
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